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1. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine strolling along a pier in an exotic port of call located in 
some strange land.  Massive, dark, ocean-going vessels are docked 
at the nearby quay to unload vast quantities of precious cargo.  
Seagulls and an occasional albatross swoop out over the sea in 
search of an elusive meal, while deceptively powerful waves pull 
urgently at the pier.  Stevedores bark out instructions in foreign 
tongues, and sailors softly sing sea shanties audible only when the 
ocean breeze is just right.  The subtle taste of brine is in the air; it’s 
surprisingly pleasant and already invokes a feeling of nostalgia. 
There is a mystery and an excitement to the port of call, in 
fiction and in life.  It seems appropriate that, swirled into this 
seaside mélange of sights, sounds, and tastes, are mysterious 
customs and practices of merchants trading their wares – customs 
and practices that have evolved through the ages.  The documents 
used in international trade contain terms of art that reflect those 
practices and are well-understood only by the initiated.  In those 
documents, the merchant and his lawyer will employ cryptic 
delivery terms:  “EXW supplier’s factory, Cape Town”; “FOB port 
of shipment, Shanghai”; “CIF port of destination, Rotterdam”; 
“DDP buyer’s plant, Chicago”; and numerous others.1  Each is a 
trade term that consists of no more than a few words, often 
                                                     
* Associate Professor of Law and Director for the Center for International and 
Comparative Law, Saint Louis University.  Thanks are due to Erika Cohn for her 
excellent research support for this article.  In addition, the author thanks Michael 
Korybut and Michael Brandon Lopez for providing helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this article, and the author thanks the editorial staff of the 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law for diligence, patience, 
and hard work.  Finally, the author gratefully acknowledges that this article was 
supported by a summer research grant awarded by Saint Louis University. 
1 EXW is an abbreviation for the trade term Ex Works; FOB is an abbreviation 
for Free on Board; CIF is an abbreviation for Cost, Insurance and Freight; and 
DDP is an abbreviation for Delivered Duty Paid.  See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, INCOTERMS® 2010: ICC RULES FOR THE USE OF DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ITEMS (2010) [hereinafter INCOTERMS] (“The Incoterms® 
rules explain a set of three-letter trade terms reflecting business-to-business 
practice in contracts for the sale of goods.”). 
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accompanied only by a reference to some location.  Yet in those 
few words there is contained a vast wealth of information 
regarding how the parties to the transaction intend to allocate 
significant risks and responsibilities between them in connection 
with shipment, transportation, and delivery of the goods.  These 
transactions might include carriage of the goods through foreign 
countries, over the high seas, through the friendly – and sometimes 
not so friendly – skies, and across national borders.  When the 
cargo, which might be worth millions of dollars, slips from the 
hoist into the depths of the cold harbor as it is unloaded following 
a long, hard voyage, which party has agreed to bear that loss?2 
When the parties have the same subjective understanding of 
the delivery term, and that shared subjective understanding is 
consistent with an objective understanding of that term that can be 
ascertained by a third party, there is unlikely to be any cause for 
disagreement regarding how that delivery term allocates risk or 
responsibility.  What if, on the other hand, the parties have 
different understandings of the meaning of the delivery term?  
What if that difference in understanding leads to a dispute 
regarding who has the responsibility to perform some task in 
connection with the transportation of the goods from point of 
manufacture to the ultimate destination, or how risk of loss has 
been allocated?  In these cases, a court will be left to determine 
what set of default provisions the selected delivery term 
incorporates and how the default provisions apply to the facts of 
the case before the court.  That can be “a costly and error-prone 
process.”3 
This issue exists for any sale of goods transaction, including 
one that takes place entirely within a single country.  But when the 
delivery term is used in a contract for the international sale of 
goods, when the buyer and seller have their places of business in 
different countries, the responsibilities allocated between the 
                                                     
2 Under the Incoterms definition of EXW and FOB, risk of loss would have 
passed from seller to buyer, and the buyer would therefore bear the risk of loss; 
under the Incoterms definition of the CIF term, the risk of loss would have 
similarly passed, but the seller would have the added obligation of purchasing 
marine insurance, and in this case that insurance would likely cover the loss; and 
under the Incoterms definition of DDP, the risk would still be with the seller, even 
though the incident might be thousands of miles from the seller’s place of 
business.  See id. 
3 Clayton P. Gillette, The Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional Design 
and International Usages Under the CISG, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 157, 158 (2004). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
02_JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2014  8:40 PM 
382 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:2 
parties involve much more complex tasks.  These tasks relate to 
exporting from the country of origin, importing into the country of 
destination, and navigating any space between the two.  Perhaps 
even more important, the risk of loss attendant to the shipment, 
transportation, and delivery of the goods can be significantly more 
pronounced due to a longer journey.  A longer journey likely 
involves more than one carrier and multiple modes of transport, 
added costs of pursuing remedies for breach when the target is 
located on the other side of the globe, and even the risk of piracy 
on the high seas.  All of this makes use of delivery terms especially 
important in the international context. 
The parties could simply write into their agreement how they 
came to agree to assign these tasks and to allocate these risks of 
loss between them.  And sometimes parties do that.  If the 
language is well-drafted and comprehensive, it will reduce the risk 
of misunderstanding between the parties regarding the terms of 
their bargain.  In fact, however, businesspersons often do not 
include comprehensive, lengthy, written terms detailing how the 
parties have allocated risk and responsibility relating to delivery.  
Instead, they simply use delivery terms that provide default 
allocation of risk and responsibility.4 
This practice is not a bad thing.5  On the contrary, normatively, 
appropriate use of delivery terms is desirable because it is efficient 
and facilitates exchange, which is ultimately a fundamental 
purpose of contract.  Using delivery terms is particularly valuable 
in the international context, where the parties will encounter 
additional barriers to trade due to language differences, logistical 
challenges, varying business practices, and different legal systems.  
The more comprehensive the default definition for the delivery 
term is, the more useful it is likely to be.  As tasks need to be 
accomplished in order to move the goods from their point of origin 
to their point of destination, the buyer and seller know who – as 
                                                     
4 See INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL HACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE, GLOBAL 
SALES AND CONTRACT LAW ¶ 29.27 (2012) [hereinafter SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE] 
(“Typically an agreement by the parties on the place of delivery occurs in 
conjunction with the agreement on other modalities of performance and is 
referred to in a shorthand manner by a trade term.”); see also JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, 
UNDERSTANDING THE CISG: A COMPACT GUIDE TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 101 (3d ed., 
2008) [hereinafter LOOKOFSKY]. 
5 Cf. Gillette, supra note 3, at 164-65 (describing administrative and error costs 
that can arise from use of incorporation strategy). 
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between the two of them – has the responsibility to see that each 
task is accomplished.  And, as risks materialize during the loading 
or unloading of the cargo or during the voyage itself, the parties 
know who bears the risk of loss at each particular moment. 
Despite the fact that delivery terms serve these important 
purposes, disagreements can and do occur regarding which party 
has assumed the risk of certain losses in connection with delivery 
of goods.  These disputes arise even when the parties have 
included a delivery term in their written agreement.6  
Disagreement regarding who bears the risk of loss when an 
unanticipated calamity that leads to the total loss of an entire 
shipment of high-cost goods can result in a major dispute. 
In fact, disputes happen.  Sometimes businesspersons make 
decisions and enter into contracts under assumptions that prove to 
be false.  Sometimes memories grow dim with the passage of time.  
Sometimes the individuals who negotiated the contract are 
replaced by new individuals who approach the relationship 
differently.  In any of these circumstances, and a host of others, the 
corporate parties can reach a point where their human 
representatives do not see eye to eye on allocation of risk.  Each 
might strongly believe the other to be responsible by contract for 
some loss.  The loss has occurred; somebody will absorb that loss; 
what does the contract tell us about how the parties have agreed 
who that somebody is? 
The simple inclusion of a delivery term in the parties’ 
agreement should prove to be helpful when answering that 
question, at least when the source for defining the delivery term is 
clear.  However, the source of the definition that the parties 
intended is not always evident.  But when the applicable source of 
the definition is discernable, the delivery term is an objective 
means of determining and allocating risk and responsibility 
between the parties.  Those delivery terms tell the parties, as well 
                                                     
6 See, e.g., BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 
333, 335 (5th Cir. 2003), as amended on denial of reh’g; Cedar Petrochems., Inc. v. 
Dongbu Hannong Chem. Co., Ltd., 769 F. Supp. 2d 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); St. Paul 
Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, GmbH, No. 00 CIV. 
9344(SHS), 2002 WL 465312, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); China N. Chem. Indus. 
Corp. v. Beston Chem. Corp., No. Civ.A. H-04-0912, 2006 WL 295395, at *1, *5 
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2006); Comptoir d’Achat et de Vente Du Boerenbond Belge S/A 
v. Luis de Ridder Limitada (The Julia), [1949] A.C. 293 (H.L.) [294] (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (U.K.); Biddell Bros. v. E. Clemens Horst Co., [1911] 1 K.B. 934 [936] 
rev’d [1912] A.C. 18 (H.L.). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
02_JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2014  8:40 PM 
384 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:2 
as third-party decision-makers, what the parties’ respective rights 
and responsibilities are.  This allocation of responsibility is true 
even though one of the parties might now regret the bargain that 
the parties have struck.  The agreement is enforced nevertheless, 
because the parties ex ante want it to be enforced; it is the 
confidence of enforcement that facilitates entry into the contract in 
the first place and ultimately facilitates commercial exchange.  As 
long as the delivery term is interpreted and applied correctly, 
which requires identifying the correct source of the definition of 
the delivery term, the expectations of the parties are protected and 
outcomes are predictable. 
For many of these sales transactions, the applicable body of 
substantive law is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, or CISG.7  The CISG facilitates 
commercial exchange in the international context in numerous 
ways, two of which are especially important for this analysis.  First, 
the CISG invites the parties to define for themselves the terms of 
their agreement.8  The CISG establishes a broad freedom of 
contract explicitly under Article 6, where the CISG provides that 
the parties to a CISG-governed contract may vary the effect of any 
of the CISG’s provisions, subject only to limited exceptions not 
                                                     
7 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 
1988) [hereinafter CISG].  Subject to certain exclusions, the CISG governs contracts 
for the sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different 
countries when the countries are “Contracting States” (or parties to the CISG).  Id. 
at art. 1(1)(a).  In the typical cross-border sale of goods transaction, when the 
parties know the goods are crossing a national border, the CISG will usually 
govern the transaction if the parties’ places of business that are most directly 
involved with the transaction are in countries that have ratified the CISG.  See id. 
at arts. 1(2) & 10(a).  Because there are currently eighty parties to the CISG, 
including most of the major trading partners of the United States, the CISG is 
potentially relevant for a very large volume of international trade.  See Dep’t of 
State Pub. Notice 1004, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262 (Mar. 2, 1987) (noting those countries 
whose trade relations with the United States would be governed by the CISG as of 
its entry into force on January 1, 1988.); see also Status of Chapter X(10): International 
Trade and Development, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ 
ViewDetails.aspx?src+TREATY&mtdsg_no=X-10&chapter=10&lang=en (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2013) [hereinafter CISG Status] (listing the current status of 
countries participating in the treaty). 
8 See, e.g., CISG, supra note 7, at arts. 6, 11 & 29(1) (stating ways in which 
contracting parties may determine the extent to which the CISG applies to their 
contract, the way in which the existence of the contract is proven, and how the 
contract can be modified or terminated). 
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applicable here.9  In fact, the CISG really allows for this variation 
throughout its text by deferring consistently to party agreement.10 
The CISG allows for parties to shape their own agreements 
under Article 9 in a way that is specifically relevant for analysis of 
delivery terms.  Under Article 9, the CISG provides for something 
called “usage” to become a binding term of the parties’ agreement, 
which can happen in either one of two different ways.11  This 
mechanism for usage to become part of the parties’ agreement is 
important for the analysis of delivery terms because a certain 
prescribed allocation of risk and responsibility under a given 
delivery term can constitute usage, and courts can use Article 9 to 
determine whether a particular source of definition for the selected 
delivery term is part of the parties’ agreement.  In international 
sales transactions, that source will often be Incoterms.  Regardless, 
it is important for courts to understand how to use Article 9 to 
identify and apply the appropriate source of definition. 
Unfortunately, however, U.S. courts have not analyzed or 
applied Article 9 correctly, and analysis by U.S. courts of delivery 
terms under Article 9 has been especially confused.  This 
misinterpretation has led to poorly reasoned conclusions and gross 
misstatements of the application of Article 9, as courts have failed 
to see that Article 9(1) and Article 9(2), reflecting different policy 
considerations, establish completely different standards for usage 
to become a term of the parties’ agreement. 
This improper analysis and misapplication of Article 9 of the 
CISG seriously undermines the CISG and its purposes.  It 
undermines the CISG for the simple reason that the CISG, as a 
treaty made under the authority of the United States, is part of the 
                                                     
9 Article 6 provides:  “The parties may exclude the application of this 
Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its 
provisions.”  Id. at art. 6. 
10 See, e.g., id.  at art. 35(2) (listing conditions when the goods do not conform 
to the contract unless the parties agree otherwise). 
11 See id. at art. 9 (“(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have 
agreed and by any practices which they have established between themselves.  (2) 
The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made 
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or 
ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and 
regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular 
trade concerned.”). 
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supreme law of the land under the Supremacy Clause.12  As part of 
the supreme law of the land, the rule of law is best served by 
appropriate and uniform application of the CISG.  More 
importantly for practical purposes, both within and outside the 
borders of the United States, when some courts interpret and apply 
the CISG properly and others do not, the stated purpose of the 
CISG to promote uniform rules for international sales transactions 
in order to “contribute to the removal of legal barriers in 
international trade and promote the development of international 
trade” is seriously undermined.13  Similarly, when some courts 
interpret and apply the CISG properly and others do not, 
contracting parties are left guessing which approach they will face.  
This uncertainty can have the effect of upsetting the reasonable 
expectations of the parties that are otherwise derived from a good 
understanding of the proper application of the CISG. 
We can do better.14  While the mysteries shrouding the 
practices of foreign merchants – represented in arcane terms of art 
set forth in their contracts – might present an impenetrable fog for 
outsiders, a clear understanding of those practices and the 
corresponding delivery terms is nevertheless objectively attainable.  
Similarly, clear understanding of the relationship between 
Incoterms, as the dominant source of definitions for those delivery 
terms in international sales transactions, and the CISG, as the body 
of law that is likely to be applicable, is readily attainable.  
Ultimately, proper, uniform application of the CISG can provide a 
mooring for international trade and commerce, for the initiated 
and uninitiated alike. 
This Article defines usage, as used in the CISG, in order to 
consider whether Incoterms should be characterized as usage for 
purposes of the CISG.  This Article then describes the misguided 
approach that to date has been taken by U.S. courts when 
                                                     
12 U.S. CONST. art. VI. (providing in relevant part:  “[A]ll Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land”). 
13 CISG, supra note 7, at pmbl. 
14 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the importance of faithful 
interpretation and enforcement of international commercial law to international 
trade.  See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 
539 (1995) (“If the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international 
accords and have a role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts 
should be most cautious before interpreting its domestic legislation in such 
manner as to violate international agreements.”). 
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analyzing the role of Incoterms as usage for contracts governed by 
the CISG.  Finally, this Article proposes a method for proper 
analysis of Incoterms under the CISG, including the role that 
Article 9 should play in the analysis. 
2. BACKGROUND ON DELIVERY TERMS 
Delivery terms provide a shorthand method for assigning to 
each of the parties various responsibilities to complete specific 
tasks relating to shipment or transportation of the goods.15  If 
export of the goods from the country of origin requires an export 
license, the delivery term might tell us who has the responsibility 
to obtain and pay for that license.  If the contract does not include 
express terms dealing with packaging of the goods, the selected 
delivery term might address packaging requirements.  The 
delivery term will be relevant for some of the logistics of actually 
getting the goods from the point of origin to the point of 
destination.  For example, the term “Freight Prepaid & Add” 
generally means that the seller will pay the carrier for 
transportation of the goods and then will invoice the buyer for the 
cost of transportation.16 
Similarly, the delivery term can indicate how payment is to be 
made.  For example, in the absence of express agreement to the 
contrary, use of the CIF delivery term requires payment against 
presentation of documents, even before the goods have reached the 
buyer.17  This payment obligation arises even though the contract 
says nothing about payment against presentation of documents.18  
This is also so even though the buyer would otherwise ordinarily 
have a right under applicable sales law to inspect the goods prior 
to tendering payment.19   
                                                     
15 These tasks might include proper storage of the goods until the carrier is 
ready to accept tender; satisfaction of customs formalities for export or import of 
the goods; obtaining marine insurance to cover 110% of the value of the goods; 
and so on.   See INCOTERMS, supra note 1, at 108–17. 
16 MICHAEL HOLLOWAY & CHIKEZIE NWAOHA, DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL 
TERMS 265 (2013). 
17 See, e.g., E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Biddell Bros., [1912] A.C. 18, (H.L.) [22] 
(“[D]elivery of the bill of lading when the goods are at sea can be treated as 
delivery of the goods themselves . . . .”). 
18 See id. at 23 (“[I]t is wrong to say that [the seller] must defer the tender of 
the bill of lading until the ship has arrived . . . .”). 
19 See id. (“[I]t is still more wrong to say that [the seller] must defer the tender 
of the bill of lading until after the goods have been landed, inspected, and 
accepted.”).  As a default matter, the UCC, for example, provides the buyer with a 
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Delivery terms also indicate where risk of loss passes from the 
seller to the buyer.20  Risk of loss can pass from the seller to the 
buyer before the goods have even left the seller’s loading dock 
under a properly worded Ex-Factory, Ex Works or similar term, for 
example,21 or the risk of loss can remain with the seller until the 
goods have reached the buyer under a DDP term, for example.22  
And risk of loss can pass at numerous points along the way.  The 
delivery term selected will automatically establish a default point 
for passage of the risk of loss.23 
While delivery terms provide default allocation of risk and 
responsibility, the precise meanings of any of these delivery terms 
will ultimately depend on the applicable source of the definition 
for the delivery term. 
2.1. Some Reasons Buyers and Sellers Use Delivery Terms 
Use of delivery terms in sales contracts is customary and very 
common, and there are several reasons for that.  For example, use 
of well-developed delivery terms contributes to certainty and 
predictability, at least to the extent the parties are or can become 
familiar with the objective understanding that a third party would 
give the delivery term.  By selecting an appropriate delivery term, 
parties define each of their respective responsibilities relating to 
shipment of the goods and satisfaction of customs formalities for 
transportation of the goods.  The parties also define the risk of loss 
while the goods are in transit.  This process allows each party to 
                                                     
right of inspection of the goods.  See U.C.C. § 2-513(1) (2012) (stating the buyer’s 
default right of inspection as recognized under the UCC).  Inclusion of a CIF 
delivery term will not obviate the right of inspection, but it will require payment 
against documents in the ordinary case, even if inspection has not yet occurred. 
20 See JOHN W. HEAD, GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE AND INVESTMENT 151 (3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter HEAD] 
(noting that some trade terms delineate when a “transfer of risk” has occurred). 
21 See, e.g., INCOTERMS, supra note 1, at 15–21 (stating that where the term is 
EXW, delivery occurs when the seller places the goods “at the disposal of the 
buyer at the agreed . . . place of delivery, not loaded on any collecting vehicle” 
and that once delivery occurs, the risk of loss transfers to the buyer); but see U.C.C. 
§ 2-319(1) (2012) (stating that where the term is F.O.B. the place of shipment, place 
of destination or vehicle, the seller bears the risk of placing goods in the 
possession of the carrier, transporting the goods for delivery, and loading the 
goods into the vehicle of delivery, respectively). 
22 See INCOTERMS, supra note 1, at 69–75. 
23 Note, however, that the delivery term does not establish at what point title 
passes. 
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properly allocate responsibility and risk in a way that is objectively 
determinable by each of them and, importantly, by third parties. 
In the ordinary case, when the source of the definition for the 
selected delivery term is clear, there should be little or no doubt as 
to how the selected delivery term allocates risk or responsibility 
(even though there may be doubt as to its application to specific 
facts).  Even if the parties are not actually aware of the allocation at 
the time they enter into the transaction, each of them can 
determine with specificity what it is, objectively, that they have 
agreed to.  That makes the likely outcome of a misunderstanding 
or disagreement predictable.  And predictability and certainty help 
to facilitate transactions and are especially important for 
international trade and commerce.24 
Using delivery terms is also efficient.25  In theory, the parties 
could attain predictability by taking the time to negotiate and write 
out detailed terms describing each step of the transportation of the 
goods and accounting for every conceivable contingency that could 
result in damage to or loss of the goods.  In the fast-paced world of 
international trade and commerce, the parties often simply do not 
take the time to negotiate and finalize a comprehensive written 
agreement that sets out all of the terms of their bargain.26  Having a 
set of tools will save time and cost.  These tools are used by parties 
to dispense with the need to rehash and then memorialize their 
precise obligations relating to movement of the goods and 
                                                     
24 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 629 (1985) (“[C]oncerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of 
foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international 
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we 
enforce the parties' agreement . . . .”). 
25 See HEAD, supra note 20, at 151 (“The overall purpose of trade terms 
generally is to provide shorthand expressions for much more complicated and 
detailed arrangements between a buyer and a seller in an international 
transaction.”). 
26 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 213 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter 
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM] (“In contracts that are formed through casual contacts . . . 
it is not unusual for the parties to omit some or all of [the terms relating to place of 
delivery, insurance, and risk of loss].”); see also William P. Johnson, The Hierarchy 
That Wasn’t There: Elevating “Usage” to its Rightful Position for Contracts Governed by 
the CISG, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 263, 265 (2012) (“More often than one might 
imagine . . . commercial arrangements simply do not result in an executed written 
agreement that reflects the agreed-upon terms and allocation of risk and 
responsibility between the parties.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
02_JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2014  8:40 PM 
390 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:2 
allocation of risk of loss of goods at various specific points in 
transit. 
In some respects, these delivery terms also constitute jargon of 
international trade and commerce.  Ordinary laypersons not 
involved in the international purchase, sale, or transportation of 
goods are unlikely to know what the term DDP means. And they 
certainly will not know how that term allocates risk or 
responsibility between the buyer and seller.  Those who are facile 
at using delivery terms as shorthand for assignment of 
responsibility can be distinguished by that knowledge from those 
who are unfamiliar with the practice.  Knowledge and use of 
commonly accepted delivery terms can contribute to a sense of 
being an insider in the world of international trade and commerce.  
This specialty knowledge can create a patina of credibility for those 
who can adroitly navigate and utilize the relevant jargon. 
In fact, the attendant allocation of risk and responsibility under 
any given delivery term might be so regularly used and can 
become so well-known within certain international trade groups 
that it eventually rises to the level of trade custom.  Once a trade 
custom, it will be understood and followed as a matter of course by 
insiders, even while mysterious and confounding to the 
uninitiated. 
Despite the numerous good reasons for use of a delivery term, 
there are challenges as well.  Part of the challenge has been that 
there are various iterations of delivery terms and their definitions 
that are used across jurisdictions and across industries.  That’s 
where Incoterms come into the picture. 
2.2. Introducing Incoterms 
The term “Incoterms” refers to a set of rules, developed by the 
International Chamber of Commerce, that provide uniform 
definitions for delivery terms commonly used by buyers and 
sellers in their sales contracts.27  Because delivery terms have long 
been used by merchants engaging in commercial transactions but 
delivery terms have been defined differently by various sources, 
the development of Incoterms was an attempt “to harmonize the 
countless variations among such [delivery] terms as they have 
                                                     
27 See INCOTERMS, supra note 1, at 5-11. 
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evolved differently in different countries and settings.”28  In that 
regard, Incoterms have really been quite effective.   
To be clear, Incoterms are not designed to replace the entire 
contract for sale; they merely supplement it.29  Specifically, the 
applicable Incoterms definition establishes allocation of 
responsibility to complete certain tasks relating to delivery of the 
goods and allocation of certain costs incurred in connection with 
delivery of the goods.30  Among other things, Incoterms address 
satisfaction of customs formalities, the obligation to obtain marine 
insurance, allocation of costs incurred in connection with delivery, 
and general obligations of the seller and the buyer, respectively.31  
Incoterms also govern allocation of risk of loss of and damage to 
goods during transportation of the goods from the point of origin 
to the point of destination.32  With respect to those matters that are 
addressed by Incoterms, Incoterms offer a detailed, comprehensive 
set of determinable rules. 
Incoterms have been around by now for more than seventy-five 
years.33  The first set of Incoterms, Incoterms® 1936, was 
introduced in 1936.34  Incoterms have been updated throughout the 
years to reflect evolving customary practices of merchants 
engaging in international trade, and the current version of 
Incoterms, Incoterms® 2010, entered into force in 2011.35 
2.3. Other Common Sources of Definitions for Delivery Terms 
Despite their growing relevance and importance, Incoterms are 
not the only source for definitions of delivery terms that are used 
in sales contracts today.  For sales of goods governed by domestic 
U.S. law, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, or UCC, 
                                                     
28 HEAD, supra note 20, at 150. 
29 See INCOTERMS, supra note 1, at 6. 
30 See id. at 5-6. 
31 See id. at xx. 
32 See id. 
33 See HEAD, supra note 20, at 153 (explaining the change in Incoterms from its 
beginning in 1936 through subsequent revisions, in order to keep pace with 
commercial developments). 
34 INGEBORG SCHWENZER, CHRISTIANA FOUNTOULAKIS & MARIEL DIMSEY, 
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 81 n.41 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter SCHWENZER]. 
35 See INCOTERMS, supra note 1, at 1. 
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provides default definitions for certain commonly-used delivery 
terms.36 
There is some overlap between Incoterms and the UCC.  For 
example, both Incoterms and the UCC define the commonly-used 
FOB, FAS, and CIF terms.37  However, both the UCC and 
Incoterms define delivery terms that are not included in the other 
source.38  The UCC defines C. & F., “Ex-Ship,” and “No Arrival, No 
Sale,” for example, none of which are specifically defined by 
Incoterms.  On the other hand, the most recent iteration of 
Incoterms defines EXW, FCA, CPT, CIP, CFR, DAT, DAP, and 
DDP, and none of these delivery terms are specifically defined in 
the UCC.39 
Of even greater importance, those terms that are common to 
the respective sources of definitions are sometimes defined in very 
different ways.  For example, the FOB term is given different, and 
in some ways incompatible, meanings under the UCC and in 
Incoterms.40  Under the UCC, the FOB term is a general delivery 
term that can be used with different modes of transport, whether 
transport occurs by air, road, rail, or water.41  By contrast, FOB 
under Incoterms requires waterway transport.42  While FOB under 
the UCC could allow risk of loss to pass to the buyer at virtually 
any named place, under Incoterms risk of loss passes to the buyer 
when the seller has delivered the goods at the port of shipment.43 
And of course there are other sources of definitions for delivery 
terms.  In the United States, for example, the American Foreign 
Trade Definitions held a place of importance for contracts for the 
                                                     
36 See U.C.C. §§ 2-319 – 2-324 (2012) (defining F.O.B., F.A.S, C.I.F., C&F, “net 
landed weight,” “payment on arrival,” “ex-ship,” “overseas,” and “no arrival, no 
sale”).  
37 Cf. id. §§ 2-319 – 2-320, 2-323 (2012) and INCOTERMS, supra note 1, at 7. 
38 Cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-320 – 2-324 (2012) and INCOTERMS, supra note 1, at 7. 
39 Cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-319 – 2-322 (2012) and INCOTERMS, supra note 1, at 7. 
40 Cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-319, 2-323 (2012) and INCOTERMS, supra note 1, at 7 
(explaining that there are two classes of Incoterms:  the first class includes rules 
“that can be used irrespective of the mode of transport selected and irrespective of 
whether more than one mode of transport is employed. FOB belongs to the 
second class of terms, which is used only when the point of delivery and the place 
which the goods are carried to the buyer are both ports.”).  See also HEAD, supra 
note 20, 151–52 (explaining that FOB “is used differently in different countries and 
different settings”).  See also SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, supra note 4, ¶ 29.35. 
41 U.C.C. § 2-319 (2012). 
42 See INCOTERMS, supra note 1, at 87. 
43 Cf. U.C.C. § 2-319 (2012) and INCOTERMS, supra note 1, at 7. 
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international sale of goods prior to the 1980 revisions to 
Incoterms.44  And delivery terms have long had meaning in the lex 
mercatoria and in the English common law tradition as well.45 
This variety of definitions and sources makes clear 
identification of the selected delivery term and the applicable 
source of the definition for that delivery term critical.  Otherwise 
the very purposes of predictability and certainty would be 
completely undermined. 
3. DELIVERY TERM DEFINITIONS AS USAGE 
Questions regarding party intent can arise even when parties 
use a delivery term.  For example, if the parties’ use of the delivery 
term is ambiguous in some way, then what have the parties, in 
fact, agreed to?  Have the parties varied the default allocation of 
cost by agreement?  Have the parties supplemented the default 
provisions by agreement?  What is the applicable remedy if one of 
the parties breaches its obligations?  When such questions arise, the 
court will turn to the applicable body of substantive law in order to 
interpret the parties’ contract and to fill its gaps.  For international 
sales of goods not involving consumer buyers, the applicable body 
of substantive law will often be the CISG.46 
3.1. Defining Usage for the CISG 
The CISG provides two ways that usage can become part of the 
parties’ agreement.47  It is evident that Incoterms are important and 
that their use is widespread; does that mean that the Incoterms 
definitions of delivery terms constitute usage for purposes of the 
CISG?  In order to determine whether Incoterms should be 
analyzed as possible usage for purposes of the CISG, it is 
                                                     
44 See generally, Peter Winship, Introduction to Incoterms, in 2 BASIC DOCUMENTS 
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 707, 707–10 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. 
Brand eds., 1990) (summarizing how Incoterms developed and attained wide-
spread acceptance). 
45 See, e.g., E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Biddell Bros., [1912] A.C. 18, 21 
(“[D]elivery of the bill of lading when goods are at sea may be treated [under a 
c.i.f. term] as delivery of the goods themselves.  That is so old and so well 
established that it is unnecessary to refer to authorities on the subject.”). 
46 See CISG, supra note 7, at art. 1(1)(a) (“This Convention applies to contracts 
of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States: 
(a) when the States are Contracting States.”). 
47 See id. at art. 9 (establishing a means for usage to become part of the 
parties’ agreement either by agreement of the parties or as an implied term). 
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important first to understand what is meant by the term “usage” as 
it is used in the CISG. 
3.1.1. The Text of the CISG 
The CISG is an international treaty.  To determine the 
applicable definition of “usage” as it is used in the CISG, 
international law governing treaty interpretation prescribes that 
one should first look to the text of the treaty.48  The CISG itself also 
calls for looking first to its text in order to determine its meaning.49 
The term “usage” is not expressly defined in the CISG.  The 
term is nevertheless used in five different sub-articles of the 
CISG.50 
“Usage” appears in Article 8(3) of the CISG.51  Under Article 
8(3), courts are directed to give “due consideration” to usage 
(among other things).52  They are to do this both under Article 8(1) 
when determining the actual intent of the parties and under Article 
8(2) when determining a reasonable person’s understanding (i.e., 
                                                     
48 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 115 
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).  
Though the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, the Vienna 
Convention is widely recognized as a codification of customary international law 
governing treaties.  To the extent the Vienna Convention is a codification of 
customary international law, it is generally binding as a matter of international 
law even on those states that are not parties to the Vienna Convention.  See, e.g., 
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179 (“The Court, whose function is to decide in 
accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply 
. . . international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law . . . .”); 
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900) (ruling on a maritime dispute based 
on an extensive discussion of applicable historical international norms in the 
absence of explicit statute or law governing both parties). 
49 See CISG, supra note 7, at art. 7(2) (stating that when issues are not 
expressly addressed in the CISG, they “are to be settled in conformity with the 
general principles” on which the CISG is based and when there are no such 
principles that are applicable, then in conformity with applicable law). 
50 See id. at arts. 4, 8(3), 9(1), 9(2), & 18(3) (citing to established usage between 
parties as an important factor in contract interpretation). 
51 See id. at art. 8(3) (“In determining the intent of a party or the 
understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be 
given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any 
practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any 
subsequent conduct of the parties.”). 
52 Id. 
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objective intent).53  Notably, this requirement to consider usage in 
order to determine party intent is mandatory, not permissive.54  
That is, courts are not simply permitted to consider usage, they 
must do so when determining party intent — at least to the extent 
the usage constitutes a relevant circumstance of the case.55 
Thus, usage is something that can impliedly demonstrate party 
intent.  Moreover, there is no hierarchy established by Article 8(3) 
for usage relative to any other source a court is to consider when 
determining party intent, making usage of potentially significant 
importance for interpreting, and therefore establishing, the terms 
of the parties’ agreement.56 
Also significant for contract interpretation is Article 9(1), under 
which parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed.57  
Any usage can qualify; as long as the parties have agreed to the 
usage, there are no additional requirements that must be satisfied.  
It is therefore clear that usage is an important means of 
establishing contract terms, both with respect to understanding the 
bargain that the parties intended to enter under Article 8(3), as well 
as with respect to supplementing under Article 9(1) any agreement 
that has been entered into by the parties. 
Still, those provisions of the CISG are not particularly helpful 
with respect to defining clearly what is meant by the term usage.  
Article 9(1) suggests that usage is distinguished from, but 
nevertheless associated with, practices established by the parties 
between themselves.  Although that does not define usage, it is a 
helpful means of understanding the scope of the meaning of usage.  
For example, under the maxim of noscitur a sociis, usage could refer 
to practices established by third parties, as a corollary to practices 
established by the contracting parties between themselves. 
Next, Article 9(2) uses the term “usage” and sheds some light 
on the meaning of the term, as it is used in the CISG: 
                                                     
53 Id.   
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See id.; see generally Johnson, supra note 26 (analyzing problems arising 
from U.S. courts misunderstanding the role usage plays in cases governed by the 
CISG). 
57 See CISG, supra note 7, at art. 9(1) (“The parties are bound by any usage to 
which they have agreed and by any practices they have established between 
themselves.”). 
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The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to 
have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its 
formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to 
have known and which in international trade is widely 
known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of 
the type involved in the particular trade concerned.58 
Article 9(2) identifies the kind of usage courts are to determine 
binds the parties as an implied term.59  It is clear from the plain 
language of Article 9(2) that usage is something that is capable of 
being “widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to 
contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.”60  
At the same time, because that qualifying language does not 
appear in Article 9(1) (or Article 8(3)), usage, as used in Articles 
9(1) and 8(3), need not actually be widely known to or regularly 
observed by parties to like contracts.61 
The other two sub-articles of the CISG that use the term 
‘usage,’ Articles 4 and 18(3), are not particularly helpful in defining 
usage.62  Article 4 addresses principles of invalidity.63  Article 4 
provides that, except as otherwise expressly provided in the CISG, 
questions regarding the validity of any usage are outside the scope 
of the CISG.64  Whether the issue of validity can even arise depends 
on whether the usage at issue is part of the parties’ agreement, 
because if it is not part of the parties’ agreement, then its validity 
or invalidity is not relevant for that contract.  Whether the usage is 
part of the agreement, such that its validity could be at issue, 
depends on the application of the principles contained in Article 
9.65   
Article 18(3) describes what constitutes an acceptance in the 
formation of a contract under the CISG.66  Specifically, mere 
                                                     
58 Id. at art. 9(2). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. at arts. 9(1) & 8(3). 
62 See id. at arts. 4 & 18(3). 
63 See id. at art. 4 (“[E]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in this 
Convention, it is not concerned with . . . the validity of the contract or any of its 
provisions or of any usage.”). 
64 Id. 
65 See id. at art. 9. 
66 See id. at art. 18(3) (describing circumstances under which the offeree may 
indicate acceptance by performing an act that would constitute acceptance, 
without notice to the offeror). 
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performance of an act normally cannot constitute acceptance 
unless there is notice to the offeror.67  But it is possible that 
applicable usage could allow acceptance to occur by performance 
of an act, even without notice.68 
Knowing whether any such applicable usage is part of the 
contract between the parties, and therefore relevant for defining 
acceptable means of acceptance, also requires application of the 
principles contained in Article 9.  Article 18(3) offers little 
independent insight regarding the meaning of the term usage. 
Ultimately, the text of the CISG does not define the term usage, 
and it offers only limited insight regarding the definition of the 
term.  We must therefore determine the definition of usage by 
some other means. 
Article 7 of the CISG prescribes the method of analysis that is 
appropriate when the text of the CISG does not answer a question 
definitively.69  Among other guidelines offered by Article 7, it 
requires considering first the general principles on which the CISG 
is based.70 
3.1.2. General Principles 
Whenever there is a question concerning a matter that is 
governed by the CISG, and the question is not expressly settled by 
the provisions of the CISG, the question is to be answered “in 
conformity with the general principles on which [the CISG] is 
based.”71 
                                                     
67 See id. at art. 18(2) (“An acceptance of an offer becomes effective at the 
moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror.”). 
68 See id. at art. 18(3) (“However, if, by virtue of the offer or as a result of 
practices which the parties have established between themselves or of usage, the 
offeree may indicate assent by performing an act, such as one relating to the 
dispatch of the goods or payment of the price, without notice to the offeror, the 
acceptance is effective at the moment the act is performed, provided that the act is 
performed within the period of time laid down in the preceding paragraph.”). 
69 See id. at art. 7(1) (stating that in interpreting the CISG, one must consider 
its “international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith in international trade”). 
70 See id. at art. 7(2) (providing in relevant part that “[q]uestions concerning 
matters governed by [the CISG] which are not expressly settled in it are to be 
settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based”). 
71 Id. 
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General principles on which the CISG is based can be derived 
from the text of the CISG itself.72  One important principle that 
ripples throughout the text of the CISG is freedom of contract, or 
party autonomy.73  The general principle of freedom of contract 
should inform and guide a court’s approach to analyzing the CISG 
and applying its terms to a contract governed by the CISG, 
including when determining whether usage has become part of the 
parties’ agreement.  When the court can determine the parties’ will, 
the parties’ will should generally govern.  That principle sheds no 
light on the precise meaning of usage, but it will be essential for the 
application of Article 9 when determining whether usage is part of 
the parties’ agreement. 
That leads to a second general principle on which the CISG is 
based - the principle of determining party intent, which should 
guide the court’s analysis as to how best to determine the will of 
the parties under the CISG.74  Under the CISG, actual intent of the 
parties, when it can be determined, prevails over any contrary 
objective intent.75  And in order to determine party intent, courts 
are to consider all relevant circumstances.76  This principle also 
sheds no particular light on the precise meaning of usage.  
Nevertheless, the principle should inform a court’s analysis under 
Article 9, to the extent that determining party intent is relevant 
under Article 9 for the court’s analysis. 
A third general principle on which the CISG is based that is 
likely to be relevant for the court’s analysis of Incoterms as usage is 
the principle of freedom from formalism.77  That is, the CISG rejects 
                                                     
72 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 136-39 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 
2010) [hereinafter SCHLECHTRIEM] (discussing general principles that are derived 
from the CISG); see also SCHWENZER, supra note 34, at 52 (describing the primacy 
of general principles when filling gaps of the CISG). 
73 See CISG, supra note 7, at art. 6 (“The parties may exclude the application of 
this Convention or . . . derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”); 
see also SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 72, at 136 (describing the importance of party 
autonomy under the CISG’s general principles). 
74 See CISG, supra note 7, at art. 8 (declaring that a party’s conduct or 
statements “are to be interpreted according to his intent”). 
75 Id. 
76 See id. at art. 8(3) (“In determining the intent of the party or the 
understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be 
given to all relevant circumstances of the case.”). 
77 See id. at art. 11 (“A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced 
by writing and is not subject to any other requirement as to form. It may be 
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any formalistic requirements for demonstrating agreement, 
including modification of an agreement.78  This principle will be 
relevant for analysis of whether and how the parties have 
manifested agreement to be bound, which is important for the 
application of Article 9. 
General principles that can be derived from the text of the CISG 
will therefore be helpful for the court’s analysis under Article 9.  
But those general principles do not define usage. 
However, the CISG may also be based on general principles 
external to the CISG.  Some commentators take the view that 
identifying general principles by reference to, for example, uniform 
laws external to the CISG is generally improper.79  Other 
commentators take the view that various bodies of international 
commercial law essentially automatically provide ready sources 
for general principles that ought to be relevant for interpretation of 
the CISG.80 
The key question is whether the identified principle, 
irrespective of its source, is a principle on which the CISG is 
actually based.81  It is certainly plausible that the drafters had 
certain principles in mind when finalizing the CISG that can be 
found in other sources of international commercial law. 
Additionally, given the CISG’s missive to interpret the CISG 
with regard to its international character,82 certain sources of 
international commercial law may be appropriate sources for 
shedding light on the meaning of CISG text.  This is true especially 
                                                     
proved by any means, including witnesses.”); see also SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 72, 
at 136 (advocating for the freedom of form). 
78 See CISG, supra note 7, at arts. 11 & 29(1) (rejecting requirements as to 
form). 
79 See, e.g., SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 72, at 139 (explaining that principles 
external to the CISG may not sufficiently reflect its international character, and 
thus may be unhelpful in interpreting ambiguity); see also SCHWENZER, HACHEM & 
KEE, supra note 4, ¶¶ 3.53-3.55 (explaining that the general principles of the CISG 
are certainly not based on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, which were adopted after the CISG was adopted). 
80 See SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, supra note 4, ¶ 3.55 (explaining that 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts have been used at 
times to discern general principles on which the CISG is based for purposes of 
Article 7(2)).  
81 See CISG, supra note 7, at art. 7(2) (prescribing that “questions concerning 
matters governed by this Convention . . . are to be settled in conformity with the 
general principles on which it is based”). 
82 See id. at art. 7(1) (“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be 
had to its international character.”). 
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to the extent that the external source is a reflection of the lex 
mercatoria or otherwise sets forth general principles of international 
commercial law that would have been known to the drafters.  
However, the drafters’ contemplation of these principles of 
international commercial law does not mean they are automatically 
relevant for the CISG.  Reaching any conclusion that the principles 
are in fact principles on which the CISG is based requires careful 
analysis. 
One potential source for determining general principles of 
international commercial law is the model law known as the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.83  It 
is true that the UNIDROIT Principles were adopted after the CISG 
came into effect.  But, as a kind of restatement of principles of 
international commercial law, the UNIDROIT Principles 
nevertheless offer evidence of general principles applicable to 
international commercial contracts that the drafters of both the 
CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles might have had in mind.84  In 
that regard, the UNIDROIT Principles can conceivably offer 
additional details concerning principles on which both the CISG 
and the UNIDROIT Principles are based.85  And although hardly 
dispositive, some commentators believe that the UNIDROIT 
Principles are intended to be used “to interpret or supplement 
international uniform law instruments.”86 
The relevant text of the UNIDROIT Principles tracks the 
corresponding text of the CISG.87  Article 1.9 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles provides that the “parties are bound by any usage to 
                                                     
83 UNIDROIT INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE L., UNIDROIT 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2010) [hereinafter 
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles 
/contracts/principles2010/integralversionprinciples2010-e.pdf. 
84 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 26, at 181 (agreeing that the 
UNIDROIT Principles are a type of international restatement of contracts and, as 
such, are generally complementary to the CISG). 
85 See UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 83, at pmbl. (asserting that one of the 
stated purposes of the UNIDROIT Principles is to “set forth general rules for 
international commercial contracts”).  See also SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, supra 
note 4, ¶ 3.55. 
86 Id.  See also CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 26, at 181 (noting that the 
UNIDROIT Principles may have legal effect when international instruments need 
supplementation or interpretation). 
87 Cf. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 83, at art. 1.9 and CISG, supra note 7, 
at art. 9 (using the identical language: “the parties are bound by any usage to 
which they have agreed and by any practices which they have established 
between themselves”). 
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which they have agreed and by any practices which they have 
established between themselves.”88  Article 1.9 further provides 
that the parties are bound by any usage “that is widely known to 
and regularly observed in international trade by parties in the 
particular trade concerned except where the application of such a 
usage would be unreasonable.”89  Thus, Article 1.9(1) of the 
UNIDROIT Principles is identical to Article 9(1) of the CISG, and 
Article 1.9(2) of the UNIDROIT Principles is very similar to Article 
9(2) of the CISG. 
The UNIDROIT Principles also do not define the term usage.  
However, the comments to Article 1.9 do show that usage reflects 
“established general lines of conduct.”90 
When the UNIDROIT Principles are considered in light of 
Article 9(2) of the CISG, usage under the CISG appears to 
contemplate generally established conduct or practices of third 
parties.    
3.1.3. Law Applicable Under Principles of Private International Law 
Whenever there is a question concerning a matter that is 
governed by the CISG, the question is not expressly settled by the 
provisions of the CISG, and the question cannot be answered “in 
conformity with the general principles on which [the CISG] is 
based,”91 the question is to be answered “in conformity with the 
law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.”92  
Any court adjudicating a conflict before it that is governed by the 
CISG will have its own rules of private international law, or 
conflicts of laws, and should apply those rules to determine the 
substantive body of law that would govern the dispute pursuant to 
those rules.93  All the while, interpretation of the CISG is to be 
conducted with regard to its international character and with an 
eye toward uniform application across jurisdictions.94 
When the transaction bears an appropriate relation to the state 
where the court is located, a court in the United States is likely to 
apply Article 2 of the UCC, as codified in the applicable state and 
                                                     
88 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 83, at art. 1.9(1). 
89 Id. at art. 1.9(2). 
90 Id. at art. 1.9 cmt. 3. 
91 CISG, supra note 7, at art. 7(2). 
92 Id. 
93 Id.   
94 Id. at art. 7(1). 
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as supplemented by the common law of that state, unless the 
parties have effectively chosen some other body of law.95  Usage is 
generally understood under the common law to refer to any 
practice that is habitual or customary.96  Under the UCC, usage of 
trade is more narrowly defined as “any practice or method of 
dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, 
or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with 
respect to the transaction in question.”97  In both the common law 
and UCC definitions, usage constitutes practices of third parties 
that reach a sufficient point of regularity as to be appropriately 
characterized as habitual or customary.  Under the UCC, if there is 
enough regularity of the practice to expect third parties to abide by 
the practice as a default matter, then it is usage of trade.  The UCC 
is specific to the United States, of course, but according to one 
leading European commentary, various legal systems generally 
agree on the definition of trade usage, and the UCC definition is 
“[i]ndicative of this common ground.”98 
Still, the CISG reflects more than the common law tradition, 
and it is important when applying the CISG not to assume that 
some domestic definition of a term used in the CISG controls.  
While considering various domestic understandings of the concept 
of usage may be helpful to glean a common definition, it is more 
important to consider the international character of the CISG.99  As 
articulated in one of the leading European commentaries on the 
CISG, the concept of trade usage should “be interpreted without 
recourse to preconceived domestic notions.”100  Instead, the focus 
should be on uniform application of the CISG in light of its 
                                                     
95 U.C.C. § 1-301(b) (2012).  The exception is the State of Louisiana, which has 
not adopted Article 2 of the UCC. 
96 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 219 (1981) (“Usage is 
habitual or customary practice.”). 
97 U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2012). 
98 SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, supra note 4, ¶ 27.31. 
99 See CISG, supra note 7, at art. 7(1) (“In the interpretation of this Convention, 
regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international 
trade.”); see also id. at pmbl. (“Being of the opinion that the adoption of uniform 
rules which govern contracts for the international sale of goods and take into 
account the different social, economic and legal systems would contribute to the 
removal of legal barriers in international trade and promote the development of 
international trade.”). 
100 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 72, at 187. 
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international character.101  And, according to that commentary, a 
usage is simply any rule of commerce that is “regularly observed 
by those involved in a particular industry or marketplace.”102 
The term ‘usage’ is not specifically defined in the CISG.  But it 
is a term that is well understood as a common term of various 
bodies of domestic sales law and as a concept that ripples 
throughout international commercial law.  Based on its association 
with practices established between the parties under the CISG; its 
understanding under the common law as habitual or customary 
practices; and its understanding under international commercial 
law as generally established conduct, it is fair to say that usage 
refers to established conduct or established practices of third 
parties, including, for example, practices that are established 
enough to be characterized as habitual or customary.  When that 
happens for a particular group—an industry group, a trade group, 
and the like—the practice constitutes usage of that group, and it 
can even become binding as an implied contract term under many 
legal traditions, including the CISG. 
3.2. Incoterms as Established Practice 
The key question, then, is whether the Incoterms definitions of 
delivery terms reflect practices that are so established that they can 
be said to have reached the point at which participants in the 
relevant industry simply expect to abide by them.  Ultimately, this 
is a factual inquiry to be undertaken by the relevant finder of fact.  
But commentary suggests that Incoterms have reached that 
point.103 
4. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 9 
Proceeding with the analysis under the assumption that 
Incoterms can constitute usage, it is important to consider what 
relevance that has for analysis and interpretation of a contract and 
its terms under the CISG. 
                                                     
101 CISG, supra note 7, at art. 7(1).  See also id. at pmbl. 
102 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 72, at 187. 
103 See, e.g., LOOKOFSKY, supra note 4, at 70 (describing Incoterms as “well-
known and widely used”); INTERNATIONAL LAWYER’S DESKBOOK 30 (Lucinda A. 
Low, Patrick M. Norton & Daniel M. Drory eds., 2d ed. 2002) (describing 
Incoterms as “an internationally recognized set of trade terms”); SCHWENZER, 
supra note 34, at 81 n.41 (“The INCOTERMS® . . . are a universally recognised set 
of definitions of international trade terms.”). 
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4.1. The Text of Article 9 
Article 9 of the CISG distinguishes between usage that becomes 
part of the parties’ agreement because the parties have agreed to 
the usage104 and usage that becomes part of the parties’ agreement 
as an implied term of the agreement without any express 
agreement by the parties regarding the usage in question.105  Thus, 
two different standards exist under Article 9 for usage to become 
part of the parties’ agreement.  Under Article 9(1), any usage can 
become part of the parties’ agreement simply because the parties 
have agreed that it should.106  Stated differently, if the parties have 
agreed that some usage is part of their agreement, then it is, and no 
additional requirements or formalities must be satisfied.107  That 
party agreement could be demonstrated in different ways;108 it 
simply must be established that the parties have so agreed. 
When the parties have not so agreed, usage might nevertheless 
become part of their agreement as an implied term.109  By way of 
sharp contrast, however, usage may only become part of the 
parties’ agreement as an implied term when certain specific 
conditions identified in Article 9(2) are satisfied.110 
Article 9(2) provides as follows: 
The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to 
have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its 
formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to 
have known and which in international trade is widely 
                                                     
104 CISG, supra note 7, at art. 9(1) (“The parties are bound by any usage to 
which they have agreed . . . .”). 
105 See id. at art. 9(2) (“The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to 
have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which 
the parties knew or ought to have known and which in international trade is 
widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type 
involved in the particular trade concerned.”). 
106 Id. at art. 9(1). 
107 Id. 
108 See id. at art. 6 (“The parties may exclude the application of this 
Convention or … derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provision.”); see also 
id. at art. 11 (“A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing 
and is not subject to any other requirement as to form. It may be proved by any 
means, including witnesses.”). 
109 Id. at art. 9(2). 
110 Id. 
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known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of 
the type involved in the particular trade concerned.111 
Thus, before concluding that a usage is an implied term of the 
parties’ agreement under Article 9(2), the court must consider 
whether three distinct requirements are satisfied with respect to 
the usage in question:  (i) whether the usage in question is a usage 
of which each party either actually knew or ought to have known, 
(ii) whether in international trade the usage is widely known to 
parties to like contracts, and (iii) whether in international trade the 
usage is regularly observed by such parties to like contracts.112  
Notably, these are questions that must be answered in the context 
of, and by reference to, the facts of the individual case before the 
court.  Article 9(2)’s reference to “contracts of the type involved” 
shows that certain usages could satisfy the requirements of being 
widely known and regularly observed in some trades but not 
others.  It is only usage that is widely known and regularly 
observed by parties to like contracts that can become part of the 
parties’ agreement as an implied term under Article 9(2). 
The party who argues for inclusion in the contract of some 
usage as a binding implied term under Article 9(2) bears the 
burden of showing that the usage in question satisfies each of these 
three requirements.  If any of these three requirements cannot be 
established, then the usage is not made part of the agreement 
under Article 9(2).113 
Even when the three requirements can be shown to have been 
satisfied, the analysis is not yet complete.  The other party must 
have the opportunity to attempt to show that the usage is 
nevertheless not a part of the parties’ agreement, because the 
parties have agreed that it isn’t—that is, Article 9(2) would have 
made the usage an implied term, but the other party has 
successfully demonstrated that the parties have “otherwise 
agreed.”114 
When the requirements of Article 9(2) are satisfied, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the parties should be bound by the 
                                                     
111 Id. 
112 Id.  See also Johnson, supra note 26, at 277–78 (describing the standards for 
establishing whether a usage is an implied term). 
113 CISG, supra note 7, at art. 9(2). 
114 Id. 
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usage as an implied term.115  The reasoning that supports this 
conclusion is as follows: 
Similarly situated third parties in international trade know 
about this usage, and those third parties abide by the usage. 
The parties to this contract also either knew or ought to 
have known about this usage, and they did not manifest 
agreement not to be bound by it. 
Therefore, it is [fair and reasonable] to conclude that these parties 
intended to abide by the usage.116 
Because Article 9(2) provides a mechanism for usage to become 
a binding term of the parties’ agreement without the parties’ 
express consent, and potentially even without their actual 
knowledge of the existence of the usage, it is only a narrow 
category of usages that are reasonable to foist upon the parties.  
Courts should therefore analyze carefully whether each of the 
requirements has actually been shown to have been satisfied before 
concluding that the definition for some delivery term—or any 
other practice—constitutes a binding implied term under Article 
9(2). 
Unfortunately, however, U.S. courts have not carefully 
distinguished between usage that is actually agreed upon by the 
parties and usage that is implied because it satisfies the three 
requirements of Article 9(2) and has not otherwise been excluded 
by the parties’ agreement.117  Some U.S. courts have simply failed 
to recognize that Article 9 of the CISG treats these two categories of 
usage differently and uses different standards to determine 
                                                     
115 Johnson, supra note 26, at 278. 
116 Id. (emphasis in original). 
117 See, e.g., BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 
F.3d 333, 337–38 (5th Cir. 2003), as amended on denial of reh’g (holding without 
extensive elaboration that BP had satisfied its implied contractual obligations if 
the goods had met the qualitative specifications upon delivery); Cedar 
Petrochems., Inc. v. Dongbu Hannong Chem. Co., Ltd., No. 06 Civ. 
3972(LTS)(JCF), 2011 WL 4494602, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (finding the 
incoterm “free on board” had been implicitly incorporated); China N. Chem. 
Indus. Corp. v. Beston Chem. Corp., No. Civ. A. H-04-0912, 2006 WL 295395, at *6 
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2006) (applying Article 9(2) to shipping dispute); St. Paul 
Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, GmbH, No. 00 CIV. 9344 
(SHS), 2002 WL 465312, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (incorporating incoterms: 
“cost, insurance, and freight”). 
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whether the usage in question is part of the parties’ agreement, if at 
all, as an agreed-upon term or an implied term. 
4.2. Scant Attention Paid to the Text of Article 9 
While there are relatively few decisions of U.S. courts 
analyzing or applying Article 9 of the CISG, those U.S. courts that 
have applied Article 9 have engaged at times in only the barest of 
analysis, failing to consider carefully the text of Article 9 in light of 
the object and purpose of the CISG.118 
The deep misunderstanding of U.S. courts regarding how 
commonly used delivery terms should be interpreted under the 
CISG and the proper role of Article 9 in that analysis is one specific 
example of this. 
4.2.1. St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co. v. Neuromed Medical 
Systems & Support, GmbH 
In one case that arose out of the sale of a mobile magnetic 
resonance imaging system, or MRI, two insurance companies, St. 
Paul Guardian Insurance Company and Travelers Property 
Casualty Insurance Company, who issued policies to the buyer of 
the MRI, brought an action against the seller, Neuromed Medical 
Systems & Support GmbH (“Neuromed”).119  The insurance 
companies brought their action against Neuromed as subrogees of 
the buyer.120   
Neuromed moved to dismiss on two grounds:  first, on the 
basis of a forum selection clause in the parties’ written 
agreement—which Neuromed argued required the action to 
proceed in Germany; and second, on the basis that the complaint 
failed to state a claim for relief.121  The court had previously 
concluded that the forum selection clause did not require the 
action to proceed in Germany, and was considering Neuromed’s 
                                                     
118 See, e.g., Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Techs., Inc., 464 F.3d 
1235, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing briefly the effect of “customary usage” 
on contract interpretation under the CISG); Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar 
Petrochemicals., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating, without 
discussing, that certain facts constituted a rejection and subsequent counter-offer 
within the meaning of Article 19(1)). 
119 St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, GmbH, No. 
00 CIV. 9344(SHS), 2002 WL 465312, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at *2.  
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second ground for dismissal.122  The court granted Neuromed’s 
motion on the second ground, and the complaint was dismissed.123 
It was undisputed that the MRI was loaded “undamaged and 
in good working order” aboard the carrier and was therefore 
apparently damaged in transit.124  Building on that undisputed 
fact, Neuromed’s argument fundamentally was that “it had no 
further obligations regarding the risk of loss once it delivered the 
MRI to the vessel at the port of shipment due to a ‘CIF’ clause 
included in the underlying contract.”125 
The written agreement between the parties specifically 
included the following express clause:  “CIF New York Seaport.”126  
No reference was made to any source for the meaning of the CIF 
delivery term.127  Neuromed argued that the applicable source for 
the definition of the CIF delivery term was the ICC’s Incoterms 
1990.128  The insurance companies argued that Incoterms were 
inapplicable because the written contract failed specifically to 
incorporate them.129 
The court applied German law and, accordingly, applied the 
CISG.130  The court rejected the insurance companies’ argument 
that Incoterms were inapplicable, conclusorily stating that 
Incoterms “are incorporated into the CISG through Article 9(2)” of 
the CISG.131  That statement by the court reflects multiple layers of 
misunderstanding of the relationship between the CISG and 
Incoterms, as well as of the role of Article 9 in the analysis. 
To be clear, the conclusion that Incoterms should provide the 
relevant definition of the delivery term used in the written 
agreement may very well be correct.  It seems entirely possible that 
the parties intended to incorporate into their agreement the 
                                                     
122 Id. at *1. 
123 Id. at *2. 
124 Id. at *1. 
125 Id.  
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 See id. at *2 (arguing that “since the delivery terms were ‘CIF New York 
Seaport,’ [Neuromed’s] contractual obligation, with regard to risk of loss or 
damage, ended when it delivered the MRI to the vessel at the port of shipment”). 
129 Id. at *4. 
130 See id. at *3 (noting that Germany is a party to the CISG); see also CISG 
Status, supra note 7 (explaining that once Germany became a party to the CISG, 
the CISG became part of the law of Germany). 
131 St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 2002 WL 465312 at *3–4. 
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Incoterms 1990 definition of the CIF delivery term used in their 
agreement.  Given that it is reasonable to assume that these 
sophisticated merchants were familiar with Incoterms, expressly 
including the CIF term in their written contract under the 
circumstances provides evidence that the parties intended to 
incorporate and be bound by the Incoterms definition.  This is so, 
even though they included the delivery term without reference to 
any source for defining that delivery term. 
The court’s conclusion is nevertheless problematic for at least 
three reasons.  First, at a fundamental level, the court sloppily 
concluded that Incoterms are part of the CISG, and not simply part 
of the parties’ agreement as contemplated by Article 9.132  In fact, 
Incoterms are not part of the CISG, nor is it necessary or 
appropriate to analyze whether they are.  On the contrary, the 
CISG contains default delivery provisions in Articles 30 through 
34, Article 60, and Articles 66 through 69.133  These provisions 
provide default rules for the obligations of the seller in connection 
with delivery of the goods;134 the buyer’s obligation to take 
delivery;135 and passing of the risk of loss.136  The parties are free to 
agree on some other allocation of risk or responsibility that differs 
from the default provisions.137  Adoption of an Incoterms definition 
as part of the parties’ agreement is one way the parties could 
derogate from or add to the CISG’s default provisions.  But the 
conclusion that Incoterms are part of the CISG itself is simply not 
accurate and is not supported by the text of the CISG. 
The court’s conclusion that Incoterms have somehow become 
part of the CISG itself reflects a troubling disregard for the text of 
the CISG, which provides for usage to bind the parties pursuant to 
Article 9(1) or to be made impliedly applicable to the parties’ 
contract or its formation under Article 9(2), but certainly not to 
                                                     
132 See id. (“INCOTERMS are incorporated into the CISG through Article 9(2) 
. . . .”). 
133 See CISG, supra note 7, at arts. 30–34, 60, & 66–69. 
134 See id. at arts. 30–34. 
135 See id. at art. 60 (“The buyer’s obligation to take delivery consists: (a) in 
doing all the acts which could reasonably be expected of him in order to enable 
the seller to make delivery; and (b) in taking over the goods.”). 
136 See id. at arts. 66–69 (detailing who assumes the risk depending on the 
context). 
137 See id. at art. 6 (“The parties may exclude the application of this 
Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its 
provisions.”). 
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become part of the CISG.138  If we were to read and apply the 
court’s statement literally, that is, if Incoterms had somehow 
become part of the CISG, then for future cases the other threshold 
requirements of Article 9—party agreement under Article 9(1) and 
the three requirements for usage as an implied term under Article 
9(2)—would be rendered meaningless.  
Of course, that must not be what the court meant.  Still, the 
court should not have carelessly asserted that Incoterms are part of 
the CISG.  They are not.  Instead, the focus should be on whether 
the Incoterms definition of a delivery term has become part of the 
parties’ agreement. 
Second, the court referred to Article 9(2) as the operative 
section without considering Article 9(1).139  If Incoterms did 
constitute usage that became a term of the parties’ agreement 
under the CISG, this is likely to have been the result of party 
agreement and, therefore, by operation of Article 9(1).  After all, 
the CIF term was an express term of the parties’ written 
agreement.140  Article 9(1) provides that the “parties are bound by 
any usage to which they have agreed.”141  Thus, the definition of 
the CIF term arguably became part of the parties’ agreement under 
Article 9(1)—rather than Article 9(2) as asserted by the court—
because the CIF term was expressly included in the written 
agreement and was therefore arguably a “usage to which [the 
parties] have agreed.”142  Ultimately, this is a factual question.  
Whether such agreement occurred here as a matter of fact does not 
seem to have been considered by the court. 
Third, and most troubling, even if Article 9(2) were the 
appropriate section of the CISG to apply in order to determine 
whether the Incoterms definition of the CIF term was part of the 
                                                     
138 See id. at art. 9 (“(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they 
have agreed and by any practices which they have established between 
themselves.  (2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have 
impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the 
parties knew or ought to have known and which in international trade is widely 
known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in 
the particular trade concerned.”). 
139 See St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, No. 00 
CIV. 9344 (SHS), 2002 WL 465312, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (“Incoterms are 
incorporated into the CISG through Article 9(2) . . . .”).  
140 See id. at *1 (discussing the existence of a CIF clause in the parties’ 
underlying contract). 
141 CISG, supra note 7, at art. 9(1). 
142 Id. (emphasis added). 
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parties’ agreement, the court failed to conduct any analysis of the 
requirements of Article 9(2) and its application to the facts of this 
case.  Specifically, in no way did the court analyze whether the 
parties knew or ought to have known of Incoterms 1990; the court 
did not analyze whether Incoterms are, in international trade, 
widely known to parties to like contracts; and the court did not 
analyze whether Incoterms are, in international trade, regularly 
observed by parties to like contracts.  That analysis is essential for 
any conclusion that usage became part of the parties’ agreement 
pursuant to Article 9(2).143  It is only usage that can satisfy the 
requirements of Article 9(2) that is impliedly made part of a 
contract under Article 9(2) of the CISG. 
Were these three requirements satisfied here?  We have no way 
to know because this analysis is entirely absent.  It seems safe to 
assume that the court did not fail to engage in the requisite 
analysis due to any sort of willful impropriety.  On the contrary, 
the court’s other analysis of the CISG is generally sound, and its 
careful consideration of German law and German decisions is 
laudable.  But by not engaging in the analysis specifically required 
by Article 9(2) in the context of the individual case before it, a court 
risks concluding that some obscure usage—actually unknown to 
the parties at the time of contract formation—nevertheless is part 
of the parties’ bargain and is binding on a party who in no way 
agreed to be bound by it, and should not be deemed to have 
agreed to be bound by it, but will be nevertheless.  That 
undermines the parties’ expectations at the time of entry into the 
contract, and it undermines the CISG’s principle of deferring to 
party intent.  Because it will be difficult to know what usages the 
court might simply unilaterally incorporate into the parties’ 
agreement, predictability will be undermined as well.  This risk 
seems especially acute for parties in developing nations or 
otherwise in markets where prevailing trade usages may still be in 
nascent stages.  And none of that is helpful to the removal of 
barriers to international trade, a core objective of the CISG. 
                                                     
143 See id. at art. 9(2). 
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4.2.2. BP Oil International, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de 
Ecuador 
In a subsequent decision by the Fifth Circuit, Incoterms were 
once again at issue.144  In BP Oil, the dispute arose out of an 
agreement by which BP Oil International, Ltd. (“BP Oil”) agreed to 
supply Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador (“PetroEcuador”) 
140,000 barrels of unleaded gasoline, to be delivered “CFR La 
Libertad—Ecuador.”145  The agreement stated that the gasoline was 
required to have a gum content of less than three milligrams per 
one hundred milliliters, which was to be established at the port of 
departure.146  After a third party tested the gasoline, BP Oil 
shipped the gasoline, but, on arrival at the port of destination, the 
gum content exceeded the permitted limit.147  PetroEcuador 
refused to accept delivery of the gasoline, and BP Oil sold it at a 
loss to a third party.148  BP Oil then filed a claim in Texas against 
PetroEcuador.149  
Applying Texas choice-of-law rules, the district court 
concluded that domestic Ecuadorian law was the appropriate 
substantive law to apply to the transaction, based on an apparent 
choice-of-law clause in the parties’ contract, which provided as 
follows:  “Jurisdiction: Laws of the Republic of Ecuador.”150  The 
district court held that under domestic Ecuadorian law, BP Oil was 
obligated to deliver conforming goods to Ecuador, the agreed-
upon destination.151  The district court granted summary judgment 
for PetroEcuador.152 
BP Oil appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s judgment dismissing PetroEcuador.153  Because the CISG is 
part of the law of Ecuador, the Fifth Circuit held the choice of law 
clause had the effect of choosing the CISG, and that the CISG 
                                                     
144 See generally BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 
F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2003), as amended on denial of reh’g. 
145 Id. at 335. 




150 Id.  
151 Id.  
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 334–35, 339.   
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therefore governed the dispute.154  In so holding, the court 
reasoned that an “affirmative opt-out requirement promotes 
uniformity and the observance of good faith in international trade, 
two principles that guide interpretation of the CISG.”155  In that 
regard, the Fifth Circuit’s clear attempt to apply the CISG carefully 
and faithfully is commendable, and its focus on uniformity is 
refreshing and helpful.  In addition, the court also engaged in 
careful and sound analysis of provisions of the CISG concerning 
latent defects.156 
However, like the court in St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co., the 
Fifth Circuit incorrectly asserted that “Incoterms are recognized 
through their incorporation into the [CISG].”157  It further stated 
that the CISG “incorporates Incoterms through Article 9(2).”158  The 
court in BP Oil engaged in at least some minimal analysis of 
Incoterms as possible usage for purposes of Article 9(2) by, for 
example, reproducing the text of Article 9(2) and reasoning that 
Incoterms are well known in international trade.159  But when the 
court concluded that the fact that Incoterms “are well known in 
international trade means that they are incorporated through 
article 9(2)”160 without actually analyzing the three discrete 
requirements under Article 9(2) in the specific context of the 
individual case before it, the court missed the subtlety of the 
provision and the actual standard set forth in Article 9(2) for 
making any given usage contractually binding on the contracting 
parties as an implied term of their agreement. 
Moreover, because there was an express reference in the 
parties’ written agreement to the CFR delivery term,161 Incoterms 
as usage arguably should have been analyzed under Article 9(1).  
The Fifth Circuit therefore ultimately committed the same three 
errors as the court in St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co. 
The analysis of the Fifth Circuit is especially disappointing 
because the Fifth Circuit was not bound in any way by the St. Paul 
Guardian Insurance Co. decision, an unpublished opinion of a lower 
                                                     
154 Id. at 337. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 338. 
157 Id. at 335. 
158 Id. at 337. 
159 See id. at 337–38.  
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 335. 
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court.  The Fifth Circuit should have recognized that the lower 
court did not perform any actual analysis in St. Paul Guardian 
Insurance Co. of the text of Article 9 before hastily adopting the 
reasoning.   Given the Fifth Circuit’s apparent care in other parts of 
the opinion, it seems likely that the court’s method of analysis 
reflects a simple lack of understanding regarding how to navigate, 
analyze and apply Article 9 of the CISG.  In order to promote the 
uniformity that the Fifth Circuit recognized should be promoted,162 
Article 9 must be interpreted and applied by U.S. and other courts 
in a uniform and proper manner. 
4.2.3. China North Chemical Industries Corp. v. Beston Chemical 
Corp. 
Following the Fifth Circuit’s decision in BP Oil, a federal 
district court in Texas continued this trend of automatic 
incorporation of Incoterms under Article 9(2) without engaging in 
the requisite analysis prescribed by the CISG.163  The case arose out 
of a contract between a Chinese seller, China North Chemical 
Industries Corporation (“Nocinco”), and a U.S. buyer, Beston 
Chemical Corporation (“Beston”), for the sale of 718 pallets of 
explosive boosters.164  The parties entered into a written sales 
agreement for the supply of the explosive boosters, which 
indicated that the explosive boosters were to be delivered “‘CIF’ to 
Berwick, Louisiana.”165  The goods were damaged in transit on the 
ocean-going vessel that had been nominated as the carrier, 
apparently due to a combination of improper stowage of the cargo, 
inadequate securing of the cargo, and a strong storm that tossed 
the ship at sea.166  Taking the position that Nocinco had undertaken 
additional obligations in connection with the loading and stowage 
of the cargo and had breached those obligations, Beston paid 
some—but would not agree to pay all—of the amounts that would 
otherwise have been due under the contract.167   
                                                     
162 See id. at 337. 
163 See generally China N. Chem. Indus. Corp. v. Beston Chem. Corp., No. 
Civ.A. H-04-0912, 2006 WL 295395 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2006). 
164 Id. at *1.  
165 Id. 
166 See id. at *4–*5 (describing conditions under which goods were damaged 
before reaching Berwick, Louisiana). 
167 See id. at *5 (“Beston made payments to Nocinco in December 1999, April 
2000, and May 2000, for a total of 15% of the Contract price.  Beston refused to pay 
the remaining balance, however, due to the Cargo’s damaged condition.”). 
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The parties agreed that the CISG governed their contract and 
dispute.168  Applying the CISG, the court concluded that inclusion 
in the parties’ written contract of the CIF delivery term allocated to 
Beston the risk of loss of the goods after the goods passed the 
ship’s rail in the port of departure.169  The court used the definition 
of CIF that is set forth in Incoterms 1990 to reach that conclusion.170  
Unfortunately, this court also conducted its analysis under the 
stated assumption that Incoterms are incorporated into the CISG 
through Article 9(2).171 
Not surprisingly, the court reached that incorrect conclusion 
with very little analysis, instead simply asserting that “Incoterms is 
the dominant source of definitions for the commercial delivery 
terms used by parties to international sales contracts,” and citing to 
the St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co. and BP Oil decisions.172  And 
thus, once again, the recurring problems with Article 9 analysis of 
Incoterms were repeated here:  the court reached this strange and 
insupportable conclusion that somehow, despite the plain 
language of Article 9 and the illogic involved, Incoterms becomes 
part of the CISG itself, rather than simply a part of the parties’ 
agreement; the court did not appear to consider whether Article 
9(1) was the relevant mechanism for concluding that the parties 
intended to incorporate into their contract the default delivery 
term definitions provided by Incoterms; and the court engaged in 
no analysis of the three discrete requirements of Article 9(2). 
This continuing careless application of Article 9 of the CISG is 
problematic in its own right.  In this case, there was a related but 
distinct problem, insofar as the court failed to recognize the 
importance of considering “all relevant circumstances of the case” 
in determining the intent of the parties.173  There was ample (and 
apparently undisputed) evidence of Beston’s actual intent for the 
proper loading, stowage, and securing of the cargo.174  The 
evidence consisted of substantial conduct by the parties, including 
actions taken by Nocinco vis-à-vis the loading and stowage of the 
                                                     
168 Id. at *6. 
169 See id. at *8. 
170 See id. at *6. 
171 Id. 
172 Id.  
173 CISG, supra note 7, at art. 8(3). 
174 See China N. Chem. Indus. Corp., 2006 WL 295395, at *1–*5 (chronicling 
Beston’s intention regarding the loading, stowage, and securing of the cargo). 
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goods, as well as numerous communications between the parties, 
subsequent to the formation of their contract.175  The evidence 
tended to show that Beston intended that Nocinco would assume 
responsibility for satisfaction of specific stowage requirements.176 
The important factual question is whether Nocinco shared 
Beston’s intent.  Arguably, Nocinco’s conduct suggested that it 
recognized an obligation under the parties’ agreement that 
exceeded the default obligations otherwise binding on Nocinco 
under the Incoterms definition of the CIF delivery term.  The court 
should have considered this factual possibility.177  That conduct 
was relevant for determining the parties’ actual intent regarding 
the scope of Nocinco’s obligations.178 
The court conclusorily stated that conduct could not trump the 
written delivery term:  “[w]hatever Nocinco did at Beston’s urging 
to accommodate its customer’s requirements for correct stowage of 
the Cargo, including the exchanges of e-mails that reported those 
activities, did not alter the CIF term contained in the parties’ 
written Contract.”179 
This statement by the court reflects the U.S. legal tradition of 
adhering rigidly to the court’s understanding of a written contract 
even in the face of contrary extrinsic evidence.  Under the U.S. 
parol evidence rule, it is generally difficult or impossible to 
introduce extrinsic evidence when the parties have entered into a 
written agreement, especially when that extrinsic evidence appears 
to contradict the express terms of the written agreement.180  But the 
                                                     
175 See id. (recounting actions taken by Nocinco in the loading and stowage of 
goods). 
176 See id. at *1 (describing Beston’s September 3, 1999 fax to Nocinco 
including a list of stowage requirements). 
177 See CISG, supra note 7, at art. 8(3) (“In determining the intent of a party or 
the understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to 
be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any 
practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any 
subsequent conduct of the parties.”). 
178 Id. 
179 China N. Chem. Indus. Corp., 2006 WL 295395 at *8. 
180 See U.C.C. § 2-202 (2012) (“Terms with respect to which the confirmatory 
memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing 
intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to 
such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any 
prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or 
supplemented (a) by course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade 
(Section 1-303) ; and (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the 
court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive 
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CISG contains no parol evidence rule.  And despite some U.S. 
jurists’ yearning to cling to the parol evidence rule and the legal 
philosophy it represents, the CISG contemplates a different 
analysis—one that recognizes that written agreements sometimes 
fail to tell the whole truth.181  Thus, under Article 8(3) of the CISG, 
courts are required to give due consideration to all relevant 
circumstances, including the parties’ established practices, usages, 
and “any subsequent conduct of the parties” in determining party 
intent.182 
In this case, it is plausible that the parties adopted the CIF 
delivery term but, at the time of contract, intended to vary the 
allocation of risk and responsibility established by the Incoterms 
definition of the CIF delivery term.  The CISG gives the parties 
great freedom to establish for themselves the terms of their 
bargain.183  This seems unlikely, because the parties could have 
simply used a different delivery term that more closely 
approximated their bargain in that case.  Still, it is a factual 
possibility, and Incoterms do contemplate varying by agreement 
the default allocation of risk and responsibility.184 
Based on the available facts, it seems more likely that the CIF 
term originally agreed upon was subsequently modified by the 
parties.  The CISG provides that a contract may be modified “by 
                                                     
statement of the terms of the agreement.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS §§ 215-216 (1981) (“Except as stated in the preceding Section, where 
there is a binding agreement, either completely or partially integrated, evidence of 
prior or contemporaneous agreements or negotiations is not admissible in 
evidence to contradict a term of the writing. . . . (1) Evidence of a consistent 
additional term is admissible to supplement an integrated agreement unless the 
court finds that the agreement was completely integrated. (2) An agreement is not 
completely integrated if the writing omits a consistent additional agreed term 
which is (a) agreed to for separate consideration, or (b) such a term as in the 
circumstances might naturally be omitted from the writing.”). 
181 See William P. Johnson, Understanding Exclusion of the CISG: A New 
Paradigm of Determining Party Intent, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 213, 216, 266-69 (2011) 
(arguing that the “writing is not dispositive of the parties' intent.”). 
182 CISG, supra note 7, at art. 8(3). 
183 See id. at art. 6 (“The parties may exclude the application of this 
Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its 
provisions.”). 
184 See INCOTERMS, supra note 1, at 9 (explaining that the Incoterms rules do 
not prohibit alterations to the rules, but warning that dangers may arise in 
altering Incoterms rules if parties do not make the alternations clear).  See also 
SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, supra note 4, ¶ 29.27 (“[P]arties usually enjoy the 
freedom of amending a trade term and as such it is always a question of contract 
interpretation.”). 
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the mere agreement of the parties.”185  And there was significant 
evidence available that might have been considered more carefully 
to take into account this possibility. 
Of course it is important to acknowledge that the parties might 
have adopted the CIF delivery term and its allocation of risk and 
responsibility without variation, and that the parties in fact never 
intended to modify that delivery term.  Such a factual finding 
would have been consistent with this court’s ultimate 
conclusion.186  But to reach that conclusion requires due 
consideration of all of the evidence available, including the parties’ 
conduct, and a finding regarding the parties’ intent, and not 
simply an assumption that the court’s understanding of a term of 
the parties’ written agreement must prevail.187   
A written contract itself of course offers important evidence of 
the parties’ intent.  But it is not the only evidence of party intent, 
and the court is obligated to consider whether the actual intent of 
the parties is better understood by reference to other relevant 
circumstances.188  Perhaps because it was unaware of its 
responsibility to do so, the court in this case does not appear to 
have engaged in that analysis. 
4.2.4. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Dongbu Hannong Chemical Co., 
Ltd. 
Finally, a federal district court in New York recently took the 
improper analysis to a new level.189  The Cedar Petrochemicals 
                                                     
185 CISG, supra note 7, at art. 29(1).  Notably, China declared when it 
approved the CISG that any provision of Article 29 of the CISG that allowed 
modification of a contract by agreement to be made in any form other than in 
writing, would not apply.  See CISG Status, supra note 7, Notes.  But Nocinco did 
not appear to base its arguments on any Chinese statute of frauds, focusing 
instead on the inclusion of the CIF term in the written agreement.  See China N. 
Chem. Indus. Corp. v. Beston Chem. Corp., No. Civ.A. H-04-0912, 2006 WL 
295395, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2006) (“Nocinco . . . contends that under the 
Contract’s CIF term the risk of loss passed to Beston”).  In addition, there were 
writings present here, including a faxed list of stowage requirements.  See id. at *1. 
186 See id. at *8 (holding that “Nocinco is entitled to recover the Contract price, 
subject to any offsets based upon Beston's claims that portions of the Cargo were 
defective and/or did not meet the Contract's quality specifications, which issue 
remains to be tried”). 
187 See CISG, supra note 7, at art. 8(3) (stating that the intent of a party must be 
determined from all relevant circumstances). 
188 Id. 
189 See generally Cedar Petrochems., Inc. v. Dongbu Hannong Chem. Co., Ltd., 
No. 06 Civ. 3972(LTS)(JCF), 2011 WL 4494602 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011). 
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decision arose out of a contract dispute between Cedar 
Petrochemicals, Inc., a New York-based buyer (“Cedar”), and 
Dongbu Hannong Chemical Co., Ltd., a South Korean supplier 
(“Dongbu”), by which Dongbu agreed to supply Cedar with a 
predetermined quantity of phenol.190  The parties entered into a 
written agreement, and the contract provided for delivery of the 
phenol “FOB Ulsan Anchorage, Korea.”191  The written agreement 
also included a clause by which the parties expressed their 
agreement that Incoterms 2000 would govern their use of the 
delivery term.192 
The agreement specified certain requirements relating to the 
color of the phenol, which were satisfied at the time of loading in 
the port of shipment, but when the phenol reached its port of 
destination, the color had degenerated and was no longer within 
the agreed-upon specifications.193  The parties disagreed as to 
whose risk the degeneration was, and Cedar brought a claim 
against Dongbu under Articles 35 and 36 of the CISG.194  Dongbu 
moved for summary judgment on the basis that the express terms 
of the parties’ written agreement displaced the CISG provisions on 
which Cedar’s claim was based.195 
In its analysis of Dongbu’s motion, the court stated, “[i]t is 
worth noting at the outset that the entire body of Incoterms—
’F.O.B.’ included—is incorporated into the CISG through Article 
9(2) thereof.”196  In this case, that misstatement of the relationship 
between Incoterms and CISG led to an even more troubling 
statement by the court:  “Dongbu makes no attempt to explain how 
a term that is made part of the CISG could also derogate from it.”197  
Thus, the misunderstanding of the relationship between Incoterms 
and the CISG had a direct effect on the court’s analysis of the issue 
before it.  This misunderstanding led to a confused analysis in 
                                                     
190 Id. at *1.  
191 Id. 
192 See id. at *3 (noting that “[a]s provided in the contract, the definition of 
‘F.O.B.’ is furnished by Incoterms (International Commercial Terms) 2000 . . . .”). 
193 See id. at *1-2 (“The parties concur that the final agreement called for 
phenol that met a color specification of 10 Hazen units maximum . . . . When the 
phenol arrived in Rotterdam . . . tests revealed that its color had degenerated to 
over 500 Hazen units.”). 
194 Id. at *2. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at *4. 
197 Id. 
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which the court then asserted, without drawing explicitly on the 
record in any way, that the parties’ written agreement did not 
“explicitly displace any provision of the CISG.”198  But of course 
that is exactly what the parties did when they incorporated 
Incoterms 2000 and the definition of the FOB delivery term into 
their agreement by explicit reference.  In doing so, they displaced 
any of the inconsistent default delivery provisions contained in 
Articles 30-34, 60, and 66-69 of the CISG. 
Fortunately, the analysis here did not turn on any of those 
provisions and, instead, turned on the latent defect provisions of 
Article 36, together with the provisions of Article 35, which contain 
terms that create the approximate equivalent under the CISG of 
warranties, express and implied, under the UCC.199  For that 
reason, the court’s gross misstatements of the operation of the 
CISG and the relationship between the CISG and Incoterms 
probably did not affect the outcome. 
4.3. Emerging Trend, Emerging Precedent? 
Taken together, these four cases highlight a recurring problem 
that arises with respect to CISG interpretation:  a tendency to 
misunderstand, or to fail altogether to see, the plain language of 
the CISG.  Here, that misunderstanding relates specifically to the 
relationship between Incoterms and the CISG. 
The precedential weight of these four cases is dubious.  Three 
are unpublished opinions of trial courts.  The remaining case is a 
published opinion of the Fifth Circuit, but the issue of the 
                                                     
198 Id. 
199 See CISG, supra note 7, at art. 35 (“(1) The seller must deliver goods which 
are of the quantity, quality and description required by the contract and which are 
contained or packaged in the manner required by the contract.  (2) Except where 
the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform with the contract 
unless they: (a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description 
would ordinarily be used; (b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or 
impliedly made known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, 
except where the circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was 
unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller’s skill and judgment; (c) possess the 
qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a sample or model; 
(d) are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, where there 
is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods.  (3) 
The seller is not liable under subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the preceding paragraph 
for any lack of conformity of the goods if, at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract, the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of such lack of 
conformity.”). 
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relationship between Incoterms and the CISG was not squarely 
before the court, nor was the court focused on discerning the 
appropriate analysis of Incoterms definitions of delivery terms as 
usage for purpose of incorporation into the parties’ agreement of 
that definition.  Thus, the decision should not be viewed as binding 
precedent as it relates specifically to those issues. 
Any court confronted with a question relating to the proper 
analysis of Incoterms and the CISG should instead use the 
following framework. 
4.4. A Framework for Analyzing Incoterms Under Article 9 
In order to analyze whether Incoterms definitions have been 
incorporated into or have otherwise somehow become part of the 
parties’ agreement and are therefore the appropriate source for 
determining how the parties have allocated between them risk of 
loss of goods in transit and the responsibility to satisfy customs 
formalities and the like, the court should engage in a careful, step-
by-step analysis that is actually contemplated by the CISG.  This 
might include analysis under Article 9, but it will not necessarily 
include Article 9. 
Of course, this is only relevant when the parties disagree on 
whether some Incoterms definition has become part of their 
agreement.  In other words, if one party has claimed that Incoterms 
is the appropriate source for allocation of risk and responsibility, 
and the other party has disputed that contention, the party 
claiming that the Incoterms definition is part of the parties’ 
agreement bears the burden of proof.  This burden of proof can be 
satisfied in one of three ways, as the following demonstrates. 
4.4.1. Incorporation by Reference 
When parties negotiate a written commercial contract, 
sometimes they agree that some ancillary document or resource 
that already exists in final form should be part of their agreement.  
This could be one of the party’s standard terms and conditions; it 
could be a Quality Assurance Program; it could be a set of industry 
standards or manufacturing practices; and so on.  The parties could 
copy the ancillary document or resource into their written 
commercial contract, word for word, line by line.  However, that 
would be time-consuming and would carry risk of error. 
Instead, parties simply incorporate the ancillary document or 
resource by reference.  In other words, the parties will include in 
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their written commercial contract an express term that makes it 
clear that that other document or resource is deemed to be part of 
the agreement between the parties and is binding on the parties, as 
if it were written into the agreement itself. 
Incoterms 2010 specifically contemplates and encourages 
incorporation by reference:  “[i]f you want the Incoterms® 2010 
rules to apply to your contract, you should make this clear in the 
contract, through such words as, ‘[the chosen Incoterms rule including 
the named place, followed by] Incoterms® 2010’.”200  And of course the 
CISG also allows incorporation by reference.  Article 6 allows the 
parties to derogate from the default provisions of the CISG, and 
Article 11 makes it clear that no particular form is necessary for 
this to be accomplished.201 
Incorporation by reference is what the parties did in the Cedar 
Petrochemicals decision.202  When the parties specifically incorporate 
Incoterms by reference, there is no need to engage in any analysis 
under Article 9.  It is enough for the court to conclude that the 
parties have exercised their right under the CISG to choose for 
themselves the terms of their bargain by expressly incorporating 
Incoterms rules into their contract. 
In short, the court should first consider whether the parties 
have incorporated Incoterms definitions into their agreement by 
selection of a delivery term accompanied by an express reference to 
a specified version of Incoterms.  The party arguing for application 
of Incoterms bears the burden to show that Incoterms have been 
incorporated by reference into the parties’ agreement.  This 
requires a factual inquiry.  If the finder of fact finds that the parties 
have incorporated Incoterms into their agreement by express 
reference, then Article 9 is unnecessary for that part of the court’s 
analysis. 
4.4.2. Usage as an Agreed-Upon Term 
Often the parties will include in their shipping documents or in 
their contract a delivery term and a named place, but will not 
                                                     
200 INCOTERMS, supra note 1, at 5. 
201 See CISG, supra note 7, at arts. 6 & 11. 
202 See Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Dongbu Hannong Chem. Co., Ltd., No. 
06 Civ. 3972(LTS)(JCF), 2011 WL 4494602, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (outlining 
the basis of the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment “on the legal 
contention that the contract displaced the provisions of the CISG under which 
[Plaintiff] brings its action”). 
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include any express reference to Incoterms.  When that happens, it 
is possible that the parties have agreed that the established 
practices prescribed by the applicable Incoterms definition for their 
selected delivery term are established practices that are part of 
their agreement.  Article 9(1) provides a mechanism for the 
established practices prescribed by the applicable Incoterms 
definition to become part of the parties’ contract by their simple 
agreement.203 
For the Incoterms definition of the delivery term to become 
part of the parties’ agreement under Article 9(1), two things must 
be shown.204  First, the Incoterms definition must constitute 
usage,205 although it is not necessary for that usage to be widely 
known or regularly observed.206  Second, the parties must have 
agreed to the usage.207  There is no real question regarding whether 
Incoterms definitions constitute usage.  Because usage refers to any 
established practices of participants within a group, the Incoterms 
definitions—which reflect established practices of merchants in a 
variety of industries—readily satisfy that definition. 
The salient question under Article 9(1), then, is whether the 
parties have agreed to the usage.  Article 9(1) requires no particular 
manifestation of party agreement.208  It is enough that the 
contracting parties have in some way agreed to be bound by the 
usage, have agreed to observe the usage, have agreed to make the 
usage applicable to their agreement, or have otherwise agreed to 
the usage.  This analysis also requires a factual inquiry.  If a party 
claims that an Incoterms definition of a delivery term is part of the 
parties’ contract as usage under Article 9(1), then that party bears 
the burden of showing that the parties have so agreed.  It is up to 
the finder of facts to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the 
parties have agreed to Incoterms definitions as the source intended 
to define their selected delivery term.209  If the finder of facts finds 
that the parties have agreed that the Incoterms definitions are the 
                                                     
203 CISG, supra note 7, at art. 9(1). 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 See id. 
207 Id. 
208 See id.; see also id. at arts. 6 & 11. 
209 Part of the analysis should focus on whether the parties actually intended 
to be bound by Incoterms, and that analysis should be grounded in the principles 
contained in Article 8.  See CISG, supra note 7, at art. 8. 
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relevant source, then the applicable Incoterms definition is a term 
of the parties’ agreement.  
4.4.3. Usage as an Implied Term 
When a court engages in the foregoing analysis and concludes 
that the party claiming that the Incoterms definitions are the 
relevant source of definitions for the contract has failed to bear its 
burden under Article 9(1), that conclusion does not necessarily end 
the analysis. 
Next, the party claiming that Incoterms provide the relevant 
definition might argue that the applicable Incoterms definition has 
become part of the parties’ agreement under Article 9(2), which 
does not require party agreement.210  This inquiry requires a more 
involved, two-part analysis.  The first part of the analysis focuses 
on whether Incoterms are the type of usage that falls within the 
scope of Article 9(2). 
In order to determine whether Incoterms are within the scope 
of Article 9(2), and therefore potentially an implied term of the 
parties’ agreement under Article 9(2), the court must consider 
whether three distinct requirements can be shown to have been 
satisfied:  
(i) Did each party know, or ought each party to have 
known, of Incoterms? 
(ii) Do Incoterms constitute a usage that in international 
trade is widely known to parties to contracts of the type 
involved in the particular trade concerned here? 
(iii) Do Incoterms constitute a usage that in international 
trade is regularly observed by parties to contracts of the 
type involved in the particular trade concerned here?211 
The party arguing for application of the applicable Incoterms 
definition as an implied term bears the burden of showing that 
these three requirements have been satisfied.  These questions 
must be analyzed and answered by reference to the particular 
trade that is relevant for the contract at issue.212  If the answer to 
                                                     
210 See id. at art. 9(2). 
211 See id. 
212 Id. 
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any of these three questions is ‘no,’ then the usage is not part of the 
parties’ agreement under Article 9(2).213  
If the answer to each of the questions is ‘yes’ and Incoterms are 
therefore the type of usage that falls within the scope of Article 9(2) 
for these contracting parties, then the second part of the analysis 
asks whether the parties nevertheless opted out of the usage.214  
Specifically, did the parties agree not to have impliedly made the 
usage in question applicable to their contract? 
It is important to note that the inquiry in the second part of the 
analysis is not whether the parties affirmatively agreed to make the 
usage applicable to their contract.215  Such affirmative agreement is 
not required under Article 9(2).216  In fact, if there is such 
affirmative agreement, then Article 9(1) is the appropriate section 
to apply.  Rather, the inquiry is whether the parties have 
affirmatively agreed not to make the usage a part of their 
agreement.217  Notably, however, Article 9(2) requires no particular 
means of manifesting that agreement.218  Once again, it requires 
factual inquiry to determine whether the parties have manifested 
such agreement. 
If the first part of the analysis shows that Incoterms are usage 
that is applicable under Article 9(2), then the burden shifts to the 
party who would like to evade application of the applicable 
Incoterms definition to show that the parties opted out of it. 
If a party claims that Incoterms are part of a contract of sale of 
goods under Article 9(2), it is up to the finder of fact to determine 
whether Incoterms are the type of usage that is within the scope of 
Article 9(2), for these parties to this contract, by applying the first 
part of the two-part analysis.  If the other party then claims that the 
parties have nevertheless opted out of Incoterms, then it is up to 
the finder of fact to determine whether that other party has met its 
burden to show that the parties have in fact opted out of Incoterms.  
If the finder of fact finds that the Incoterms definition is within the 
scope of Article 9(2) and does not find that the parties have opted 
out of Incoterms, then the applicable Incoterms definition is a term 
of the parties’ agreement. 
                                                     
213 See id. 
214 See id. 
215 See id. 
216 See id. 
217 Id. 
218 See id.; see also id. at arts. 6 & 11. 
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The foregoing analysis could also apply even when the parties 
have included no delivery term in their contract documents.  It will 
be much more difficult for the party who would like a particular 
Incoterms definition to be part of the agreement to carry its 
burden, but the analytical framework is the same. 
5. CONSIDERING THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CISG 
5.1. Using the Travaux Préparatoires  
The travaux préparatoires of the CISG support the foregoing 
analysis of the role of Incoterms under the CISG.  When the text of 
a treaty is insufficient to answer a question definitively, the treaty’s 
travaux préparatoires, or drafting history, should be considered.  
Specifically, a treaty’s drafting history is relevant to confirm the 
text, context, object, and purpose of the treaty, to resolve 
ambiguity, and to prevent a “manifestly absurd or unreasonable” 
result.219  It is therefore important to consider what, if anything, the 
travaux préparatoires tell us about the role of Incoterms or other 
commonly used delivery terms under Article 9 of the CISG. 
A draft of the CISG was prepared by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and a 
diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries consisting of 
representatives of sixty-two independent states, including the 
United States, was convened in 1980 to consider the draft.220 
5.2. Incoterms in the Travaux Préparatoires 
The First Committee of the Conference considered the draft 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
                                                     
219 Vienna Convention, supra note 48, at arts. 31(2) & 32.  U.S. courts, in 
particular, have shown willingness to use a treaty’s travaux préparatoires to 
interpret the treaty.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 325 Reporters’ Note 1 (1987) (“United States courts, accustomed 
to analyzing legislative materials, have not been hesitant to resort to travaux 
préparatoires.”). 
220 See U.N. Conf. on Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods, Vienna, Austria, 
Mar. 10–Apr. 11, 1980, Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, ¶¶ 1–3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (Apr. 11, 1980), 
reprinted in U.N. Conf. on Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods, Official Records, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19, at 176–77 (1991) [hereinafter Official Records], available 
at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/a-conf-97-19-ocred-e. 
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approved by UNCITRAL,221 whereupon several amendments to 
Article 9 (numbered in the draft as Article 8) were proposed.222  
Specifically, the travaux préparatoires reveal that the drafters 
considered two proposals intended to make it more explicit that 
trade terms, including specifically Incoterms, would automatically 
be deemed to be part of the usage described in Article 9.  However, 
the drafters rejected the proposals.223 
The first proposal was an amendment to Article 9(2) that was 
proposed by Sweden.224  The proposed Sweden amendment was to 
insert the words “or an interpretation of a trade term” between the 
words “a usage” and “of which the parties knew.”225  Thus, Article 
9(2) would have read as follows: 
The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to 
have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its 
formation a usage or an interpretation of a trade term of 
which the parties knew or ought to have known and which 
in international trade is widely known to, and regularly 
observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the 
particular trade concerned.226 
The second proposal was an amendment proposed by Egypt to 
add a third paragraph to Article 9, as follows:  “[w]here 
expressions, provisions or forms of contract commonly used in 
                                                     
221 U.N. Conf. on Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 
10–Apr. 11, 1980, Text of Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods Approved by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (Mar. 14, 1979), reprinted in Official Records, supra note 220, at 
5–14. 
222 “Amendments were submitted to article 8 by China 
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.24), Czechoslovakia (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.40), India 
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.34), Sweden (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.19), Pakistan 
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.64), United States of America (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.6), France 
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.23) and Egypt (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.44).”  U.N. Conf. on 
Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 10–Apr. 11, 1980, 
Report of the First Committee, art. 8, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/11 (Apr. 7, 1980) 
[hereinafter Report of the First Committee], reprinted in Official Records, supra note 
220, at 89. 
223 U.N. Conf. on Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 
10—Apr. 11, 1980, Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings, 7th Plenary Meeting, ¶¶ 
61, 63, [hereinafter Summary Records – 7th Plenary] reprinted in Official Records, supra 
note 220, at 269. 
224 Report of the First Committee, supra note 222, at art. 8, ¶ 3. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. (underlining denotes proposed additional language). 
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commercial practice are employed, they shall be interpreted 
according to the meaning usually given to them in the trade 
concerned.”227 
Both amendments were intended to account for commonly 
used delivery terms such as Incoterms.228  Because their purpose 
was the same, the two proposals were discussed together at the 
seventh meeting of the First Committee.229  Mr. Hjerner of Sweden 
explained that the aim of the sponsors of the two proposals was “to 
cover the question of the interpretation of trade terms, such as 
‘FOB’, ‘CIF’, ‘landed’ and ‘net weight’.”230  Mr. Shafik of Egypt 
confirmed that his purpose was the same “to reintroduce the 
reference to trade terms.”231 
There was some support for the idea.232  Mr. Dabin of Belgium, 
for example, stated that he “saw no reason why the draft should 
make no reference to INCOTERMS.”233  However, there was also 
strong opposition grounded in the notion that Incoterms were not 
necessarily widely known or widely used, and that other sources 
of delivery terms, such as U.S. commercial law, provided different 
definitions for certain delivery terms.234 
In fact, one of the unsuccessful predecessor conventions to the 
CISG, the Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the 
International Sale of Goods, adopted by the International Institute 
for the Unification of Private Law, or UNIDROIT, included a 
provision that appeared more squarely to incorporate definitions 
of commonly used trade terms into its provisions.  That convention 
provided that “[w]here expressions, provisions or forms of contract 
commonly used in commercial practice are employed, they shall be 
interpreted according to the meaning usually given to them in the 
                                                     
227 Id. 
228 See Summary Records — 7th Plenary, supra note 223, ¶¶ 36-58, reprinted in 
Official Records, supra note 220, at 267-69 (noting that the delegation from Belgium 
suggested adding a specific reference to Incoterms to the Egypt amendment for 
clarity and noting that the delegations from Japan, France, and the USSR objected 
to the amendment on the grounds that “Incoterms were not well known 
everywhere”). 
229 Id. ¶ 34. 
230 Id. ¶ 36. 
231 Id. ¶ 38. 
232 See id. ¶ 37 (noting the Belgium representative). 
233 Id. 
234 See id. ¶¶ 44, 52-53, 55 (noting the objections of Mr. Lebedev [Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics] and Mr. Michida [Japan] to the Egyptian proposal, 
based primarily on the “unduly vague” language of the proposed provision). 
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trade concerned.”235  When the CISG was drafted the drafters 
dropped that provision.  Although there was some subsequent 
discussion regarding the value of reintroduction of that 
provision,236 it was not reintroduced. 
Ultimately, the proposed amendments were rejected by the 
First Committee.237  Subsequently, at the sixth meeting of the 
Plenary Committee, the Swedish representative withdrew the 
Swedish amendment and the Egyptian amendment was rejected.238 
Incoterms and other delivery terms therefore could become 
part of the parties’ agreement under Article 9, but Incoterms 
should not automatically become part of the parties’ agreement 
without the requisite analysis.  Instead, Incoterms should be 
analyzed in the same way that other potentially applicable usages 
are analyzed, through the appropriate lens of Article 9. 
6. CONCLUSION 
A troubling trend has begun to emerge as U.S. courts have 
undertaken early analysis of the relationship between Incoterms 
and the CISG.  U.S. courts have demonstrated misunderstanding of 
the relationship between Incoterms and the CISG and the role of 
Article 9 of the CISG in the analysis.  Three related but distinct 
problems have recurred.  These problems can be corrected by 
courts who look carefully at the language of Article 9 of the CISG. 
Thus, courts should never conclude that Incoterms definitions 
are somehow incorporated into the CISG itself.  That is illogical, 
insupportable, and improper.   
Courts should also not conclude that Incoterms definitions 
constitute a binding term of the parties’ contract under Article 9(2) 
without first engaging in the analysis required by Article 9(1).  
                                                     
235 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods 
art. 9(3), July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 107. 
236 See U.N. Conf. on Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods, Vienna, Austria, 
Mar. 10–Apr. 11, 1980, Analysis of Comments and Proposals by Governments and 
International Organizations on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, and on Draft Provisions Concerning Implementation, Reservations and 
Other Final Clauses, Prepared by the Secretary-General, art. 8, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.97/9 (Feb. 21, 1980), reprinted in Official Records, supra note 220, at 71-82.  
237 Report of the First Committee, supra note 222, art. 8, ¶ 3, reprinted in Official 
Records, supra note 220, at 90. 
238 U.N. Conf. on Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 
10–Apr. 11, 1980, Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings, 6th Plenary Meeting, ¶¶ 
56, 59-60, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/SR.6 (Apr. 8, 1980), reprinted in Official Records, 
supra note 220, at 202-03. 
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When the parties have included in their written agreement an 
express delivery term but have simply failed to identify in their 
written agreement the source of law to be used to define that 
delivery term, it is entirely possible that the parties have in fact 
agreed that the Incoterms definition of the delivery term is the 
applicable definition.  If the fact finder finds that that was the 
actual intent of the parties, after considering all relevant 
circumstances of the case, the Incoterms definition of the term is 
arguably part of the parties’ agreement under Article 9(1), which 
allows for incorporation into the agreement of the usage in 
question by the mere agreement of the parties. 
Finally, when analyzing usage under Article 9(2), which 
provides for usage to become a binding part of the parties’ 
agreement without their express consent, the court must carefully 
consider each of the three discrete requirements created by Article 
9(2) to identify usage that is appropriately binding on contracting 
parties as an implied term.  It is only usage that can satisfy those 
requirements in the context of the particular case before the court 
that is reasonable to impose on the parties without their express 
consent. 
Delivery terms serve highly important purposes for 
international trade and commerce; they increase efficiency, they 
contribute to a sense of association and group identity, and they 
aid in certainty and predictability—at least they should.  
Furthermore, delivery terms can and will contribute to certainty 
and predictability more regularly, once U.S. courts begin to look 
more carefully at the language of Article 9 of the CISG.  It is 
essential that courts do so to facilitate, rather than hinder, 
international trade.  It is essential because predictable, proper 
analysis and uniform application of Article 9 are necessary in order 
to avoid unfair surprise, to protect the reasonable expectations of 
the parties, and to contribute to certainty in the otherwise rough 
seas of international trade and commerce. 
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